Goddard v. United States

Background

Jamel Goddard filed a self-represented motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, a procedure that allows a federal prisoner to seek correction of a sentence in limited circumstances. The motion concerned his sentence in the related criminal case, No. 17-CR-00439 (LAP). A grand jury had charged him with offenses involving a domestic sex-trafficking and prostitution enterprise. He later pleaded guilty to Count One, which charged conspiracy to sex traffic individuals, including minors, under 18 U.S.C. § 1594(c). The government agreed to dismiss the other counts at sentencing.

The plea agreement specified a base offense level of 30, an applicable offense level of 33, and an agreed sentencing range of 235 to 293 months. It also provided that Goddard would waive direct appeal and collateral challenges to any sentence within or below that range. On August 15, 2018, the court sentenced him to 292 months of imprisonment, within the agreed range. The Second Circuit affirmed his conviction on July 17, 2019.

Goddard’s Motion and the Government’s Response

Goddard argued that the court had incorrectly used a base offense level of 30 under U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3(a)(2). He contended that the court should instead have used level 24 under the guideline’s “otherwise” provision in § 2G1.3(a)(4). He challenged only the base offense level, not the later adjustments that produced an applicable offense level of 33.

The government argued that the motion was time-barred, that Goddard had waived his right to challenge the sentence, and that the court had correctly applied the Sentencing Guidelines.

Timeliness

The court held that the motion was filed after the one-year deadline in 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(1). Goddard’s conviction became final on December 29, 2019, after the 90-day period for seeking review by the Supreme Court expired. His deadline to file the § 2255 motion was therefore December 29, 2020. Because he first expressed his intention to file a § 2255 motion in April 2022, the court ruled that the motion was time-barred.

Plea-Agreement Waiver

The court also held that Goddard knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to challenge a sentence within the agreed sentencing range. His 292-month sentence fell within the range of 235 to 293 months. The court found no indication that the waiver was not made voluntarily, knowingly, or competently, and found no applicable exception, such as an unconstitutional sentencing factor, a government breach of the plea agreement, or the court’s failure to explain its sentence.

Sentencing-Guidelines Issue

The court alternatively reached the merits of Goddard’s argument and held that the sentencing calculation was correct. Under U.S.S.G. § 2X1.1(a), the base offense level for a conspiracy generally comes from the guideline for the substantive offense that the defendant conspired to commit. The court determined that the relevant substantive offense was sex trafficking a minor under 18 U.S.C. § 1591(b)(2). Under U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3(a)(2), that offense carries a base offense level of 30.

The court rejected Goddard’s argument that the conspiracy conviction qualified for the catch-all base level of 24 under § 2G1.3(a)(4). It found the reasoning of the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Valdez more persuasive than the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Wei Lin because the cases involved different underlying offenses and different guideline language. The court concluded that Goddard was not “otherwise” convicted within the meaning of § 2G1.3(a)(4).

Disposition

Judge Loretta A. Preska denied Goddard’s motion to vacate his sentence. The court denied it as time-barred, held that the plea-agreement waiver independently barred the challenge, and ruled that the sentencing court had correctly calculated the Guidelines range. The clerk was directed to close the open motions and civil case No. 22-CV-03288.