Brown v. County of Westchester

Background

Bianca Brown sued Westchester County, Adeel Mirza, Shameika M. Mathurin, Miriam E. Rocah, Anthony A. Scarpino, and Cynthia A. Adimari. Brown alleged that Mirza sexually harassed her and made race-related comments, that supervisors retaliated after she complained, and that Adimari retaliated after Brown objected to what she believed was an inaccurate disclosure letter in a criminal case. Brown also alleged that she was reassigned, subjected to unfavorable work conditions, publicly criticized, and terminated.

The Second Amended Complaint asserted fourteen claims, including discrimination and retaliation under Title VII; equal-protection and municipal-liability claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; discrimination, harassment, hostile-work-environment, retaliation, and aiding-and-abetting claims under the New York State Human Rights Law; whistleblower and negligent-supervision claims under New York Labor Law § 740; and common-law claims for emotional distress, tortious interference with contract, and defamation.

The County, Rocah, Scarpino, Mathurin, and Adimari filed a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which asks whether the complaint states a legally sufficient claim. Mirza did not join that motion and had filed an answer. On a motion to dismiss, the court generally accepts well-pleaded factual allegations as true and decides whether they plausibly support relief.

Federal claims

The court held that Brown adequately exhausted her Title VII discrimination and retaliation claims through her charge filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. However, conduct occurring before December 11, 2020—more than 300 days before the charge—consisted of discrete acts that could not independently support her Title VII claims.

The court denied dismissal of Brown’s first claim, the Title VII discrimination claim against the County. It held that Brown plausibly alleged race discrimination, sex or gender discrimination, and a hostile work environment based on conduct within the relevant period. But the court dismissed the sexual-harassment theory to the extent it relied on Mirza’s November 2019 conduct, because that conduct was outside the filing period.

The court granted dismissal of Brown’s second claim for Title VII retaliation. It held that Brown’s objections to the alleged inaccurate criminal-case disclosure were not protected activity under Title VII, and that her earlier sexual-harassment complaint and related workload allegations were too remote or untimely to support the claim.

For the third claim, an equal-protection claim under § 1983, the court granted dismissal as to the County, Scarpino, and Rocah, but denied dismissal as to Adimari and Mathurin. The court found that Brown did not adequately allege the County’s participation in a constitutional violation or Scarpino’s and Rocah’s personal involvement. It found that Brown alleged sufficient personal involvement by Adimari and Mathurin. The court also noted that Brown’s opposition did not address the sufficiency of the § 1983 claim against Scarpino and treated that claim as abandoned against him.

The court dismissed the fourth claim, the municipal-liability claim under Monell, against the County. Brown alleged only generally that the County had unwritten policies, procedures, customs, and practices, without identifying a specific policy or describing facts showing that the alleged conduct was widespread or consistent.

New York State Human Rights Law claims

The court granted dismissal of the fifth claim for discrimination, sixth claim for sexual harassment, and fourteenth claim for hostile work environment as to the County, Scarpino, and Rocah. It concluded that Brown had not adequately alleged Scarpino’s or Rocah’s personal involvement. It also held that the claims against the County were barred by the notice-of-claim requirement because the relevant alleged conduct occurred more than 90 days before Brown’s first notice of claim.

The court denied dismissal of the fifth, sixth, and fourteenth claims as to Adimari and Mathurin. Those claims therefore remained pending against those defendants.

For the seventh claim, New York State Human Rights Law retaliation, and the ninth claim, aiding and abetting, the court found that Brown plausibly alleged conduct by Scarpino and Rocah in their individual capacities. The court therefore denied dismissal of those claims against Scarpino and Rocah individually. It granted dismissal of the seventh claim against the County and against Scarpino and Rocah in their official capacities, and granted dismissal of the ninth claim against Scarpino and Rocah in their official capacities. The court denied dismissal of the seventh claim against Adimari and Mathurin and of the ninth claim against Adimari and Mathurin.

New York Labor Law and common-law claims

The court dismissed the eighth and tenth claims under New York Labor Law § 740. It held that Brown did not plausibly allege that the alleged disclosure violation in one criminal case created a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety. The court separately held that § 740 does not apply to public employers such as the County.

The court denied dismissal of Brown’s eleventh claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress and twelfth claim for tortious interference with contractual relations against Adimari. Because Adimari was sued only in her individual capacity, the notice-of-claim requirement did not apply to those claims. The court found Brown’s allegations sufficient at the pleading stage.

The court granted dismissal of the thirteenth claim for defamation against Adimari and Rocah. The court held that the specifically identified statement—that Brown “ruined the case on purpose”—was filed outside New York’s one-year defamation limitations period. It also held that the statement was a nonactionable opinion about Brown’s work performance.

Disposition

Judge Philip M. Halpern concluded that the motion to dismiss was GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Claims that remained pending included the Title VII discrimination claim against the County; the § 1983 equal-protection claim against Adimari and Mathurin; specified New York State Human Rights Law claims against Adimari, Mathurin, and the individual-capacity claims against Scarpino and Rocah; and the two common-law claims against Adimari. The moving defendants were directed to answer the Second Amended Complaint within 14 days.