Walker v. Capra

Background

Jerard (Gerald) Walker, proceeding without a lawyer and without paying the filing fee, sued the New York Department of Corrections and Community Supervision commissioner, Sing Sing Correctional Facility officials, and other Sing Sing employees. He asserted claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal law allowing suits against state actors for certain constitutional violations. The claims involved the First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment.

Walker alleged that he was placed in keeplock twice in August 2021 for not having a razor, including once without a disciplinary hearing. He also alleged that CO Grant-Hall choked him and issued a false disciplinary report in November 2021; defendants did not move to dismiss that excessive-force claim.

Walker further alleged that he was not paid, or was paid at a lower rate, for mess hall work; that Manuel, Helms, and Stasko retaliated by removing him from the job after he complained; and that he was confined in the special housing unit from July 22 to August 26, 2022. He alleged that his August 5, 2022, disciplinary hearing denied him witnesses, documents, the ability to question the report’s author, and an impartial hearing officer. He also alleged that he was denied certain services, property, work, food, out-of-cell time, and congregate Catholic religious practice while confined. The opinion states that Walker asserted a state-law claim under New York’s Humane Alternatives to Long-Term Solitary Confinement Act against Velez; defendants did not move to dismiss that claim.

Defendants’ Motion and Official-Capacity Claims

Defendants filed a partial motion to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Rule 12(b)(1) concerns the court’s power to hear a case, while Rule 12(b)(6) tests whether the complaint states a legally sufficient claim. The court accepted well-pleaded factual allegations as true for purposes of the motion and read Walker’s filings liberally because he was representing himself.

The court held that the Eleventh Amendment barred Walker’s claims for money damages against the defendants in their official capacities. It also dismissed his request for injunctive relief against Annucci in his official capacity because the allegations concerned past acts and did not show an ongoing violation of federal law. The court did not add a prejudice qualifier to these dismissals.

Personal Involvement

The court dismissed the claims against Annucci, Capra, Rodriguez, and Thorpe in their personal capacities for lack of sufficient allegations showing their direct personal involvement in a constitutional violation. Walker alleged that these officials failed to enforce the state Humane Alternatives to Long-Term Solitary Confinement Act or, in Thorpe’s case, directed that he be restrained. The court found these allegations too vague and concluded that merely alleging a failure to enforce state law or a failure to correct an alleged violation was not enough to establish personal involvement under Section 1983.

First Amendment Retaliation

The court dismissed Walker’s First Amendment retaliation claim against Manuel, Helms, and Stasko. Walker alleged that he filed complaints and grievances about his pay and that these defendants then took adverse actions, including removing him from the mess hall position and prejudging a disciplinary hearing. The court held that he did not allege facts connecting those actions to his complaints with enough specificity to show retaliation.

First Amendment Religious-Exercise Claim

The court dismissed Walker’s First Amendment claim against Velez based on the alleged denial of congregate Catholic religious services from August 5 through August 26, 2022. The court assumed, for purposes of the motion, that Walker’s religious beliefs were sincere but held that he did not explain how missing the services burdened those beliefs. This claim was dismissed without prejudice, and Walker was allowed to try to allege additional facts about his sincerely held beliefs and the effect of missing the services.

Fourteenth Amendment Procedural-Fairness Claim

The court dismissed Walker’s procedural due process claim against Manuel, Bodge, Cheverez, Quick, Helms, and Stasko. Due process generally requires a protected liberty or property interest and constitutionally adequate procedures before the government takes that interest away.

As to the August 2021 keeplock periods, Walker alleged approximately two weeks of confinement but did not allege conditions showing an unusually serious hardship compared with ordinary prison life. As to the August 5, 2022, disciplinary hearing, Walker alleged that he spent approximately 34 days in the special housing unit, received a 165-day sanction, lost privileges, and lost three months of good-time credit. The court found that the allegations did not clearly establish a protected liberty interest because it was unclear whether Walker lost credit he had already earned or merely lost an opportunity to earn credit in the future. The court stated that, if Walker could establish a protected interest, his allegations about being denied witnesses and evidence were otherwise sufficient to describe a possible due process violation.

The court also held that Walker had no constitutional liberty or property interest in a prison work assignment or timely payment of prison wages. The court dismissed the due process claim without prejudice and allowed Walker to provide more detail about whether he lost already-earned good-time credit. To the extent Walker asserted a separate state-law claim based on requests for records under New York’s Freedom of Information Law, the court held that it lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate that claim and dismissed it.

Equal Protection

The court dismissed Walker’s Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim. Walker alleged that prisoners at other correctional facilities received property and services that he did not receive at Sing Sing. The court held that he did not identify a specific, sufficiently similar person for comparison and therefore did not plausibly allege either discrimination based on a protected class or a claim that he was treated differently from an individual who was essentially identical in relevant respects.

Section 1983 Conspiracy

The court dismissed Walker’s Section 1983 conspiracy claim. It held that Walker did not adequately allege an underlying constitutional violation and, independently, that his allegations that the defendants conspired were conclusory. He did not provide facts showing an agreement, coordinated actions, or specific acts taken to advance an alleged conspiracy.

Leave to Amend and Disposition

The court granted the motion. All claims addressed by the motion were dismissed. The court granted Walker leave to file a second amended complaint concerning only the First Amendment religious-exercise claim against Velez in her individual capacity and the Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim against Manuel in her individual capacity. The second amended complaint had to replace, rather than supplement, the existing amended complaint and include the claims that were not challenged.

Walker’s Eighth Amendment excessive-force claim against Grant-Hall and his Humane Alternatives to Long-Term Solitary Confinement Act claim against Velez were allowed to proceed because defendants did not move to dismiss them. Walker was required to file the second amended complaint by February 2, 2024. The court stayed the deadline for Grant-Hall and Velez to answer while awaiting that filing. It also certified that an appeal would not be taken in good faith and denied fee-free status for an appeal, and it terminated Capra, Thorpe, Annucci, Bodge, Helms, Quick, Rodriguez, Stasko, and Cheverez from the case.