Jallow v. Geffner

Background

Yaya Jallow, proceeding without a lawyer and previously granted permission to proceed without prepaying filing fees, sued numerous defendants under constitutional and federal statutory theories. He alleged that shelter personnel, police officers, correctional officers, government agencies, and others participated in a criminal enterprise and conspiracy that caused arrests, detention, loss of property, discrimination, unsafe shelter and jail conditions, and physical injuries. He sought declaratory relief and money damages.

The allegations concerned events in Manhattan, Brooklyn, and Rikers Island. Among other things, Jallow alleged that he was arrested after breaking a shelter window; that correction officers at Manhattan Central Booking forced him into a fight and one officer broke three of his ribs; that he experienced food, temperature, bedding, and safety problems at Rikers Island; and that he experienced various shelter, employment, financial, and housing-related problems in Brooklyn.

Brooklyn claims transferred

The court concluded that the claims arising from Brooklyn involved separate events, defendants, and factual questions and could not properly remain joined with the Manhattan and Rikers Island claims. Under Rule 21, the court severed the Brooklyn claims against Samaritan Daytop, Yvelyse Marrero, John McDonald, The Doe Fund, Rogers Avenue Housing Development Fund Corporation, Lawrence McKenzie, David Bell, and Milton E. Calderon. Under the federal transfer statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), it transferred those claims to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York because the underlying events occurred in Brooklyn and relevant documents and witnesses could reasonably be expected to be there.

Claims dismissed

The court screened the complaint under the statute governing complaints filed without prepayment of fees. It dismissed the civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act claims because Jallow did not allege facts showing the required pattern of racketeering activity or agreement to form a racketeering enterprise. It also dismissed the conspiracy claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 because the complaint did not provide specific facts showing an agreement, the conspiracy’s formation or operation, or related overt acts.

The court treated Jallow’s constitutional claims as claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a civil remedy when a person acting under state authority violates federal rights. It dismissed the claims against Project Renewal, Edward I. Geffner, Leticia Randal, and Robert Lashley because the complaint did not show that these private defendants acted under state authority. It dismissed the false-arrest claims against Joshua Maye and Raheen Rivers because Jallow’s allegations indicated probable cause for the arrest, and dismissed the Miranda-warning allegation because failure to give those warnings does not itself create a § 1983 claim.

The court dismissed the claims against the New York City Department of Correction because a city agency generally cannot be sued separately from the City of New York. It treated the claims against Commissioner Louis A. Molina as official-capacity claims and concluded that Jallow had not alleged a City policy, practice, or custom causing a constitutional violation. The court likewise dismissed the claims against the City of New York for failure to allege such a policy, practice, or custom. Claims against the State of New York were barred by state sovereign immunity, and the damages claim against Attorney General Letitia James in her official capacity was also barred by that immunity.

The court further dismissed claims based on shelter conditions and lack of access to particular housing because federal law does not create a constitutional right to housing or placement in a particular shelter. It dismissed the Rikers Island claims concerning one missed meal, one night in a cold dormitory, and failure to protect from other detainees because the complaint did not allege sufficiently serious conditions, intentional or reckless conduct, or personal involvement by a named correction official. The court dismissed the race-discrimination claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and the Fair Housing Act because Jallow did not allege facts showing that race caused the challenged conduct or that he suffered unlawful housing discrimination. It also dismissed claims based on federal criminal statutes because a private person cannot initiate a federal criminal prosecution. The court deferred deciding whether to exercise jurisdiction over any state-law claims because it was not yet clear whether Jallow could state a federal claim.

Excessive-force claim and leave to amend

The court construed Jallow’s allegations about being forced into a fight with Correction Officer David Terrel and four other correction officers at Manhattan Central Booking as a possible excessive-force claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. It found the allegations potentially sufficient to suggest such a claim but insufficiently detailed as pleaded. The court granted Jallow 60 days to file a second amended complaint describing what led to the fight, how the officers forced him into it, the injuries he suffered, and the involvement of the four other officers. Jallow could identify unknown officers as John Doe or Jane Doe.

The court granted leave to amend only this excessive-force claim. It warned that the second amended complaint would replace, rather than supplement, the original complaint, and that reasserting dismissed claims could result in dismissal of the entire action. No summons would issue at that time. The court also certified that an appeal would not be taken in good faith and denied permission to proceed without prepaying fees for an appeal.

Judge

Judge Laura Taylor Swain issued the order and signed it on January 2, 2024.