Wilburn v. Galloway

Background

Andre Wilburn brought a self-represented action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal civil-rights law, against Valerie Galloway, Samuel Gompers Houses, and the New York City Housing Authority. He alleged that the defendants violated his rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments by failing to properly secure his apartment after his arrest and a law-enforcement search. He alleged that his apartment was later ransacked and that personal property was stolen or damaged.

Wilburn alleged that Galloway, the manager of Samuel Gompers Houses, knew or should have known that the apartment had been entered and ransacked. He also alleged that the apartment was secured with a damaged door and a flimsy padlock accessible to numerous housing employees. The complaint did not state what relief Wilburn sought. The court understood him to be seeking money damages for the lost or damaged property. To the extent he sought the return of property seized by law-enforcement officers, the court said that the proper method was a motion in the related criminal case under Rule 41(g) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Federal Property-Loss Claim

The court explained that a § 1983 claim requires a violation of a constitutional or federal right by a person acting under state law. It recognized that the New York City Housing Authority and its employees are state actors for this purpose. But the court held that a person generally cannot bring a federal due-process claim for property loss when state law provides an adequate remedy.

The court found that Wilburn had not shown that available state remedies were inadequate or inappropriate. It cited possible state remedies, including actions for negligence, replevin, or conversion and an action in the Court of Claims. Because those remedies were available, the court dismissed Wilburn’s property-loss claim for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

State-Law Claims and Amendment

After dismissing the federal claims, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction—the court’s authority to hear related state-law claims—over any state-law claims Wilburn might be asserting. The court also denied leave to amend because it concluded that the complaint’s defects could not be cured by amendment.

Disposition

Judge Laura Taylor Swain dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. The court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state-law claims, certified that an appeal would not be taken in good faith, denied permission to proceed without paying fees for an appeal, and directed the Clerk of Court to enter judgment.