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S.D.N.Y.Procedural orderFiled Jan. 8, 2024

Anderson v. Hochul

Judge
Laura Swain
Docket
1:23-cv-09528
Court
U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
Pages
13
Civil RightsSection 1983First AmendmentPro Se
In one sentence

In Anderson v. Hochul, Judge Swain dismissed Anderson’s claims over a COVID-19 vaccine mandate but allowed 30 days to replead one religious-accommodation claim.

Who this affects

Khalig Alim Anderson’s federal claims were dismissed at the complaint-screening stage, although he was given 30 days to amend a First Amendment religious-accommodation claim against Molly Wasow Park and Gary P. Jenkins. The defendants named in the dismissed claims were no longer required to defend those claims in the current complaint.

What happened

In Anderson v. Hochul, Khalig Alim Anderson, representing himself, sued New York State and New York City officials, private individuals, and others over his decision not to receive a COVID-19 vaccine while employed at New York City Health + Hospitals. He alleged that officials denied his request for a religious exemption or accommodation and denied him unemployment benefits.

The court dismissed Anderson’s constitutional, civil-rights, racial-discrimination, and federal criminal-statute claims because the complaint did not adequately connect some defendants to the alleged conduct, some defendants were private individuals, the unemployment-benefits claim did not allege that available procedures were inadequate, and the complaint did not allege race-based discrimination. The court also dismissed the claim against the hospital executive concerning the vaccine exemption, while declining to decide any state-law claims, including the alleged contract claim.

Judge Laura Taylor Swain dismissed the complaint under the screening rules for cases filed without advance payment of fees, but granted Anderson 30 days to amend his First Amendment claim concerning the alleged denial of a religious accommodation by Molly Wasow Park and Gary P. Jenkins. The court also denied fee-free status for any appeal and kept the case open until judgment is entered.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

Case
Anderson v. Hochul · No. 1:23-cv-09528
Judge
Laura Swain
Date
Jan. 8, 2024

Background

Khalig Alim Anderson, who was representing himself, sued state and city officials, private individuals, and other defendants. He principally invoked 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985(2), and also asserted claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and 18 U.S.C. §§ 241–242. His claims arose from his decision not to be vaccinated against COVID-19 in 2021 while employed by New York City Health + Hospitals (H+H).

Anderson alleged that, after New York adopted a COVID-19 vaccination requirement for healthcare workers, he requested a religious exemption or accommodation. He alleged that Molly Wasow Park and Gary P. Jenkins denied that request. He also alleged that Roberta Reardon denied his application for unemployment insurance because he did not comply with his employer’s vaccine mandate. Anderson sought damages, injunctive relief, and a $1 million declaratory judgment against former Governor Andrew Cuomo for an alleged breach of contract.

Screening standard

Because Anderson was allowed to proceed without paying filing fees in advance, the court was required to screen the complaint. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the court had to dismiss claims that were frivolous, failed to state a claim for relief, or sought money from an immune defendant. The court also had to dismiss claims over which it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. Although courts read self-represented complaints liberally, the complaint still had to provide enough factual detail to make a legally valid claim plausible.

Section 1983 claims

Section 1983 provides a civil remedy when a person acting under state law violates a right protected by the Constitution or federal law. The court dismissed Anderson’s Section 1983 claims against Governor Kathy Hochul, former Governor Andrew Cuomo, Mayor Eric Adams, former Mayor Bill de Blasio, Commissioner Ashwin Vasan, and former Commissioner Dave A. Chokshi because Anderson did not allege facts showing their personal involvement in the challenged employment decisions.

The court dismissed the Section 1983 claims against William J. Hochul, Chirlane McCray, Melissa Aguirre Chokshi, Walter Cline Reardon, and Wanda Henry Jenkins because Anderson identified them as private individuals and did not allege that they acted under state law. The court dismissed the claims against H+H CEO Dr. Mitchel Katz and Labor Commissioner Roberta Reardon for failure to state a claim. It granted Anderson leave to allege additional facts concerning Park’s and Jenkins’s alleged decisions about his religious accommodation as an H+H employee.

Unemployment benefits and due process

The court treated Anderson’s allegation that the denial of unemployment benefits was “arbitrary and capricious” as a claim that he was denied procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. The court explained that New York law provided a process for challenging an initial unemployment-benefits decision, including a hearing, appeals, and judicial review. Because Anderson did not allege that he used that process or that it was inadequate, the court dismissed the due-process claim against Reardon for failure to state a claim.

Religious exemption and accommodation claims

The court dismissed Anderson’s First Amendment claim against Katz based on the denial of a religious exemption. It relied on Second Circuit precedent holding that New York’s healthcare-worker vaccine requirement was constitutional and did not require a religious exemption. The court noted, however, that the precedent recognized that an employer might be able to accommodate religious objections by assigning an employee in a way that removed the employee from the rule’s definition of covered personnel.

Anderson alleged that Park and Jenkins denied a religious accommodation, but he did not provide facts describing the denial or their alleged refusal to allow an appeal. The court therefore granted him leave to amend this claim. If he amended it, the court required him to identify his job title, the accommodation he sought, why it was denied, the individuals who personally denied it, and the people personally involved in the employment decision.

Other federal claims and state-law claims

The court dismissed Anderson’s Section 1981 claim because the complaint did not suggest that race played any role in the defendants’ decisions. Section 1981 prohibits intentional racial discrimination in contractual relationships, and the court stated that race must be a determining cause of the alleged loss of a protected right.

The court also dismissed Anderson’s claims under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242 because those criminal statutes do not create a private civil cause of action. After dismissing the federal claims over which it had original jurisdiction, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction—the court’s authority to hear related state-law claims—over any state-law claims, including the alleged breach-of-contract claim against former Governor Cuomo.

Disposition

The court dismissed the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), with 30 days’ leave to replead the First Amendment religious-accommodation claim. If Anderson did not file an amended complaint within that period, the court stated that the Clerk would be directed to enter judgment. The court certified that an appeal would not be taken in good faith and denied Anderson permission to appeal without advance payment of fees. The court directed the Clerk to keep the matter open until a civil judgment was entered.

The authoritative version

Read the full 13-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.

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