Coccaro v. Barnard College

Background

Julia Coccaro brought a proposed class action against Barnard College for breach of implied contract and unjust enrichment. She alleged that she was enrolled during Barnard’s Spring 2020 semester and paid approximately $27,890.50 in tuition and a $943.50 mandatory fee. The complaint alleged that Barnard marketed an in-person, on-campus education and highlighted campus facilities, services, activities, and New York City as part of the educational experience.

According to the complaint, Barnard suspended in-person classes on March 11, 2020, moved classes online, canceled events, limited campus services and access, and requested that students leave residence halls. The complaint further alleged that services covered by the mandatory fee—including health and wellness services, fitness facilities, student events or sports, and an in-person commencement—were terminated, canceled, or severely curtailed. Coccaro alleged that Barnard provided prorated refunds for housing and meal plans but did not refund tuition or the mandatory fee.

Barnard filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), arguing that Coccaro failed to state a claim. A motion for judgment on the pleadings tests whether the complaint and other pleadings legally support relief, using the same standard as a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. At this stage, the court accepts well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draws reasonable inferences for the plaintiff.

Breach of Implied Contract

The court explained that, under New York law, enrolling in a university creates an implied contract between the institution and the student. The terms may be found in materials such as bulletins, circulars, and regulations made available to students. To state a breach-of-contract claim, a complaint must allege an agreement, the plaintiff’s performance, the defendant’s breach, and damages.

Barnard argued that Coccaro did not identify a specific contractual promise requiring in-person instruction. The court rejected that argument at the pleading stage. Coccaro alleged that Barnard’s website, course catalogue, and other materials described the benefits of personal contact with faculty and staff, a residential community, campus facilities, collaborative learning spaces, campus activities, and New York City as an extension of the campus. The court concluded that these allegations plausibly supported a mutual expectation that students would receive generally in-person courses, activities, facilities, and services.

The court also rejected Barnard’s arguments that the pandemic justified its actions, that Coccaro had accepted or ratified the changed arrangement by receiving course credits, and that a catalogue disclaimer defeated the claim. The court stated that an impossibility defense—which may excuse certain contractual performance when performance becomes impossible or impracticable—could not be resolved on the pleadings because it generally requires factual inquiry, including examination of the party asserting the defense. The court also stated that receiving some benefit, such as credit toward a degree, did not establish that Coccaro received the full value allegedly promised. It further concluded that the disclaimer was not an unambiguous basis for dismissing the claim.

As to the mandatory fee, Barnard argued that Coccaro had not alleged a promise of in-person services, that the fee applied regardless of how much a student used a service, and that Barnard continued providing services online. The court found those arguments unpersuasive at this stage because Coccaro’s theory concerned her alleged right of access to in-person services, not merely her actual use of them.

Unjust Enrichment

Under New York law, an unjust-enrichment claim requires allegations that the defendant was enriched, at the plaintiff’s expense, and that fairness and good conscience require the defendant to return what the plaintiff seeks to recover. Barnard argued that its campus closure and transition to online instruction were justified by the pandemic and therefore its retention of tuition and fees was not unjust.

The court held that the relevant question was not whether Barnard was justified in closing the campus and moving instruction online, but whether it was justified in retaining the full tuition and mandatory-fee payments. The court concluded that determining whether Barnard benefited from savings or whether it would be fair for Barnard to retain the money required factual development and could not be resolved on a motion to dismiss.

Disposition

The court DENIED Barnard’s Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings and directed the Clerk of Court to close the motion at ECF No. 18. The opinion did not determine ultimate liability, the amount of any recovery, or whether a class would be certified.