Fatima v. Porter

Background

The plaintiffs were nine parents suing David Banks, in his official capacity as Chancellor of the New York City Department of Education, and the New York City Department of Education. They sued on behalf of their minor children, who had been classified under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act as students with disabilities, and some parents also sued individually.

The parents had obtained administrative “pendency orders” requiring the Department to retroactively fund their children’s placement at the International Institute for the Brain for the 2019–2020 and 2020–2021 school years. By the time the lawsuit began, the Department had made most, but not all, of the required payments. The parents moved for a preliminary injunction, which is a temporary court order intended to prevent harm while a case is pending, requiring immediate payment of the remaining amounts.

The Department did not dispute that the children were entitled to funding under the administrative decisions. It argued, however, that all required payments had been paid or authorized for payment, except for payments requiring additional information from the parents. The Department submitted a sworn declaration from Sapna Kapoor, the Director of its Impartial Hearing Order Implementation Unit, describing the payment process.

Court’s Analysis

To obtain a preliminary injunction, the parents had to show irreparable harm, meaning harm that could not adequately be remedied later, and either a likelihood of success on the merits or serious questions supporting their claims combined with a strongly favorable balance of hardships. They also had to show that an injunction would serve the public interest.

The court held that the parents had not shown irreparable harm. Although the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act’s pendency provision is intended to preserve a child’s educational status quo during a dispute, the parents cited no authority requiring the Department to make pendency payments instantaneously. The court found no indication that the timing of payments to the school or vendors had affected, or could affect, the children’s education.

The court also held that the parents had not shown a likelihood of success on the merits. They offered no evidence establishing that the Department was delinquent in complying with the pendency orders. The Department’s evidence indicated that nearly all payments had either been made or processed, while some payments required additional information from the parents.

The parents later identified a dispute over the Department’s responsibility to pay special transportation costs for one child under a November 2021 pendency order. The Department maintained that the order was erroneous and had appealed it. The court concluded that this single disputed payment did not establish the broader pattern of delayed payments alleged by the parents.

Ruling

Judge Laura Taylor Swain denied the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. The court instructed the parties to confer in good faith and provide a status letter about any remaining disputes within 30 days. The order resolved docket entry number 4.