Carroll v. Trump

Background

This defamation case concerned statements Donald J. Trump made in June 2019 after E. Jean Carroll publicly accused him of sexually assaulting her in the mid-1990s. The court had previously resolved liability on a motion for partial summary judgment. The January 2024 trial concerned damages only, and the jury returned a verdict for Carroll totaling $83.3 million.

During that trial, Carroll testified that she had deleted some electronic messages containing threats. Trump’s counsel moved orally for a mistrial in front of the jury, arguing that Carroll had admitted deleting evidence connected to her damages claim. The court immediately denied that motion and instructed the jury to disregard defense counsel’s remarks. Trump later filed a letter motion again seeking a mistrial. Alternatively, he requested that the court strike portions of Carroll’s testimony, prevent an award of damages related to death threats, or give the jury an adverse-inference instruction—that is, an instruction allowing the jury to assume that missing evidence would have hurt Carroll.

Mistrial requests

The court declined to reconsider its oral denial. It explained that reconsideration requires a change in controlling law, newly available evidence, or a need to correct clear error or prevent manifest injustice. Trump relied on the same testimony heard during trial and identified no new law, overlooked authority, or clear error.

The court also stated that the mistrial request would have failed on the merits. A mistrial would only have dismissed the jury and required a new trial; it would not have resolved whether any electronic messages had been improperly destroyed. By the time of the written motion, the case had already been tried to a verdict. The jury had heard evidence and arguments about the deleted messages, and the court had given an instruction addressing them.

Requested discovery sanctions

The court analyzed Trump’s alternative requests under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(e), which governs electronically stored information that should have been preserved for litigation but was lost. Before sanctions can be imposed, the moving party generally must establish that the information should have been preserved, cannot be restored or replaced through additional discovery, and caused prejudice. More severe sanctions, including an adverse-inference instruction, also require proof that the opposing party intended to deprive the movant of the information’s use in the litigation.

The court found that Carroll had no duty to preserve the messages before mid-July 2019 because, based on her testimony and the absence of contrary evidence, she did not first anticipate suing Trump until an attorney discussed litigation with her then. Her deletion of threatening messages shortly after her accusation became public therefore occurred before any preservation duty arose.

The court assumed without deciding that Carroll might have deleted some electronic messages after she began anticipating litigation. Even under that assumption, Trump did not show that the messages were permanently lost or could not be recovered through discovery. Trump had known about the deletions since at least Carroll’s January 2023 deposition and had not shown that he tried to obtain the messages.

The court also held that Trump failed to prove prejudice. It defined prejudice in this context as proof that the missing evidence would have supported Trump’s defense, not merely that the evidence might have been relevant or helpful. Trump argued that the deleted messages could have shown that Carroll’s threats were caused by other events or did not resemble Trump’s statements. The court found those theories speculative. It also noted that the deletion of some threatening messages may have benefited Trump by reducing the evidence supporting Carroll’s damages claim.

The court alternatively found no required intent to deprive Trump of evidence. Carroll testified that she deleted threatening messages to reduce the distress they caused and regain control of the situation. The court found no evidence that she acted with the intent required for the more severe Rule 37(e) sanctions.

Rule 37(b) and timeliness

The defense also referred to a possible subpoena and suggested that Carroll’s conduct could support sanctions under Rule 37(b), which addresses violations of discovery orders. The court declined to treat the motion as one under that rule because Trump did not expressly request Rule 37(b) sanctions. In addition, he provided no evidence showing what the subpoena required, when it was served, or what court order or discovery obligation Carroll violated.

The court further held that the requests were untimely. Trump had known of the alleged deletions for nearly a year and raised the issue only during Carroll’s cross-examination, in front of the jury, without giving the court advance notice. The court concluded that the existing trial procedures—cross-examination, closing argument, and the jury instruction—were all the relief the circumstances could have justified.

Disposition

The court denied Trump’s oral motion and letter motion as lacking merit. It also denied the requested alternative sanctions, including striking testimony, limiting damages, and giving an adverse-inference instruction.