DeJesus v. Bon Secours Community Hospital

Background

Samantha DeJesus sued her former employer, Bon Secours Community Hospital, and her former supervisor, Lyn Wessels. She alleged retaliation and interference under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), discrimination and retaliation under the New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL), and unequal pay and retaliation under the New York Equal Pay Act (NYEPA) and New York Labor Law section 215.

DeJesus alleged that coworkers and Wessels treated her negatively after she announced her first pregnancy in 2019 and that Wessels objected to her use of intermittent leave. She also alleged that she and Specialist Doe discovered in May 2020 that they were paid less than some coworkers, complained about the pay difference, and received pay increases that did not compensate them for earlier pay differences. DeJesus alleged that Wessels then attempted to issue her a write-up and denied certain requests for time off.

DeJesus announced her second pregnancy in December 2020. In January 2021, after exposure to COVID, she requested permission to work remotely during a quarantine period. She alleged that she was terminated on January 15, 2021, for abandoning her position and failing to call off or appear at work, but that the stated reasons were a pretext for retaliation related to her pregnancy, her pay complaints, and her request for leave.

FMLA claims

The defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which tests whether the complaint adequately states a legally sufficient claim. The court ruled that FMLA claims based on events before January 12, 2021, were time-barred because DeJesus did not argue that the alleged violations were willful. The court therefore limited its review of the FMLA claims to allegations concerning her alleged need for leave in 2021.

The court denied dismissal of the FMLA retaliation claim. DeJesus alleged that she was terminated less than three weeks after announcing her second pregnancy and that the defendants terminated her before she could use leave because they did not want to provide leave to which she was entitled. At the pleading stage, the court held, the timing and the alleged history of hostility were enough to plausibly connect the termination to her anticipated FMLA leave.

The court dismissed the FMLA interference claim. DeJesus did not adequately allege that she was entitled to FMLA leave during the COVID-related quarantine because she alleged that she tested negative, had only aches and a headache, and was not caring for family members who had tested positive. As to her pregnancy-related claim, she did not allege that the lack of notice about FMLA rights caused her to lose or forfeit leave. The court stated that this allegation was more appropriately considered as part of her retaliation claim.

NYSHRL claims

The court dismissed DeJesus’s NYSHRL retaliation claim because her general allegations that she reported discriminatory treatment did not identify specific protected activity. Her complaints to a union representative about the write-up process and denied time off did not allege that she was opposing discrimination based on a protected characteristic.

The court also dismissed all of DeJesus’s NYSHRL discrimination claims. Her disparate-treatment theory relied on comparisons with Specialist Paganetti, who was also a woman, and DeJesus did not allege that she was pregnant or disabled when the cited unequal treatment occurred. Her pregnancy-based hostile-work-environment allegations occurred more than three years before the action began, and her later allegations did not plausibly connect the mistreatment to her gender. Her failure-to-accommodate claim also failed because the alleged COVID exposure, negative tests, aches, and headache did not plausibly show a disability under the NYSHRL. The court likewise found no allegation of a pregnancy-related complication that met that law’s definition of disability.

Because DeJesus did not adequately plead an underlying NYSHRL violation, the court dismissed her NYSHRL aiding-and-abetting claim against Wessels.

NYEPA and New York labor-law claims

The court rejected the defendants’ argument that Wessels could not be held individually liable under the NYEPA claims. At this stage, DeJesus adequately alleged that Wessels acted as her employer because she supervised DeJesus, controlled or approved vacation requests, and allegedly had authority affecting the terms and conditions of employment.

The court allowed DeJesus’s unequal-pay claim comparing her with Specialist Doe to proceed. She alleged that Doe was hired on the same day, had the same experience and background, performed the same functions and duties, and was paid one dollar more per hour. The court dismissed the unequal-pay claims involving Specialist Paganetti and Team Leader Bullock because DeJesus provided insufficient facts showing that their work required the same level of skill, effort, and responsibility. The court noted that Bullock had a somewhat supervisory role and that DeJesus did not provide sufficient information about Paganetti’s experience or tenure.

The court treated DeJesus’s retaliation claim as arising under New York Labor Law section 215 because the NYEPA itself does not prohibit retaliation. The court dismissed that claim as untimely as to alleged retaliation before January 12, 2021. It also held that the approximately eight-month gap between DeJesus’s pay complaints and her termination was too long, by itself, to plausibly show a causal connection.

Disposition

The court granted in part and denied in part the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The FMLA interference claim, the New York labor-law retaliation claim, the unequal-pay claims involving Specialist Paganetti and Team Leader Bullock, and all NYSHRL claims were dismissed. DeJesus’s FMLA retaliation claim and unequal-pay claim involving Specialist Doe may proceed, subject to the court’s limitation concerning allegations accruing before January 12, 2021. DeJesus’s withdrawn New York City Human Rights Law claim was also dismissed. The court denied her request for leave to file a second amended complaint and directed the defendants to answer the amended complaint by February 26, 2024.