Rimini v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co.
- John Cronan
- 1:21-cv-07209
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 11
In Rimini v. J.P. Morgan Chase, Judge Cronan denied Rimini’s request to reopen the dismissal, and also denied requests for default judgment and fees.
Thomas Rimini’s Rule 60(b) motion was denied, leaving the earlier dismissal in place. His request for default judgment was also denied. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co.’s request for attorney fees and costs was denied because no legal basis was identified.
What happened
In Rimini v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., Thomas Rimini, an attorney representing himself, asked the court to provide relief from its earlier dismissal of his lawsuit against his former employer. His lawsuit concerned alleged retaliation, blacklisting, discrimination, and interference with later employment opportunities.
The court had previously dismissed the case because Rimini did not meet the administrative exhaustion requirements for his complaint to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Rimini then sought reconsideration and later asked the court to reopen the judgment, repeating arguments about notice of the agency’s findings and the timeliness of his appeal.
Judge Cronan denied Rimini’s motion for relief under Rule 60(b), concluding that none of the rule’s grounds applied and that Rimini was trying to relitigate issues already decided. The court also denied Rimini’s request for default judgment and denied J.P. Morgan Chase & Co.’s request for attorney fees and costs because it identified no legal basis for that request.
The detailed version
- Rimini v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. · No. 1:21-cv-07209
- John Cronan
- Feb. 27, 2024
Background
Thomas Rimini, an attorney proceeding without a lawyer, sued J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. (JPMC). Rimini had previously worked for JPMC and later unsuccessfully interviewed for another position. He filed a complaint with the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) under the antiretaliation provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, alleging that protected comments during his 2011 interview led JPMC to blacklist him with potential employers.
OSHA issued preliminary findings on October 14, 2016, concluding that Rimini had not shown an adverse employment action for purposes of a Sarbanes-Oxley violation. The findings gave him 30 days to object and request a hearing before an administrative law judge, warning that they would become final and not subject to court review if he did not object. Rimini waited more than four and a half years before appealing to the Department of Labor’s Office of Administrative Law Judges.
Rimini then filed this federal action. On September 29, 2022, the court dismissed the action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because Rimini had not satisfied the administrative exhaustion requirements for his 2016 OSHA complaint. The court later denied reconsideration, rejecting Rimini’s argument that he lacked notice of OSHA’s findings. It explained that JPMC had served him with a brief containing the findings on June 4, 2018, which made his later objections untimely.
Rule 60(b) motion
Rimini moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), which allows a court, in limited circumstances, to relieve a party from a final judgment or order. His motion did not identify a specific subsection and generally argued that the court had erred in dismissing his complaint. The court considered each of Rule 60(b)’s six grounds.
Under Rule 60(b)(1), relief may be available for mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. The court found that Rimini was repeating his previously rejected argument about notice of OSHA’s findings and was not entitled to another opportunity to litigate that issue.
Under Rule 60(b)(2), relief may be available for newly discovered evidence that could not previously have been found with reasonable diligence and could have changed the outcome. The court found that Rimini had presented discussions of prior proceedings, not newly discovered evidence, and had not shown that those matters would change the jurisdictional ruling.
Under Rule 60(b)(3), relief may be available for fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct by the opposing party. The court found that Rimini identified no misconduct by JPMC during this litigation and no fraud on the court. His allegations concerned conduct before the lawsuit, and he had been able to present his case.
Under Rule 60(b)(4), a judgment may be set aside if it is void because of a fundamental jurisdictional or due-process defect. The court rejected this ground because it had dismissed the case after finding that subject-matter jurisdiction was lacking, had not decided the merits of Rimini’s complaint, and had not violated due process.
Under Rule 60(b)(5), relief may be available when a judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, is based on a reversed or vacated earlier judgment, or has an inequitable prospective effect. The court found that none of those circumstances existed.
Under Rule 60(b)(6), relief may be available for another reason that justifies relief when extraordinary circumstances or extreme hardship are present. The court found that Rimini’s status as a self-represented litigant and his statement that he was recovering from injuries did not establish extraordinary circumstances. The court also explained that Rule 60(b)(6) cannot substitute for an appeal or serve as a way to repeat disagreement with the judgment.
Other requests and disposition
Rimini also asked the court to enter a default judgment in his favor. The court denied that request because JPMC had defended the litigation and therefore had not failed to appear or defend. JPMC requested attorney fees and costs incurred in responding to the motion. The court denied that request because JPMC had not identified a legal basis for an award.
The court denied Rimini’s motion for relief under Rule 60(b) and directed the clerk to close the motion at Docket Number 104.
Read the full 11-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.