Suarez v. Sullivan

Background

Elvin Suarez sued employees of the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision and mental-health professionals employed by the New York State Office of Mental Health. He alleged that, while incarcerated at Downstate Correctional Facility, defendants violated the Eighth Amendment by failing to adequately educate him about his need for medication, failing to provide appropriate individual mental-health therapy, and housing him in segregated confinement despite his serious mental illness. He also asserted a claim under Section 137(6) of the New York Correction Law, known as the Special Housing Unit exclusion law, against Ryan Lahey, Samantha L. Kulick, and Maura L. DiNardo.

Suarez was incarcerated at Downstate from June 22 through September 5, 2017. He had been diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type, and was classified as needing the highest level of mental-health care. After an August 8 incident involving threats and an assault on a correction officer, he was held in the special housing unit while awaiting a disciplinary hearing. The hearing concluded on August 22. Suarez received a sentence of time served in the special housing unit and 60 days in keeplock, with 30 days suspended. He was released from Downstate on September 5 and stabbed his mother the following night.

Summary-judgment standard

The court applied the summary-judgment standard under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence shows no genuine dispute about a fact that could affect the outcome and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court was required to view disputed facts and reasonable inferences in Suarez’s favor, but unsupported assertions and evidence that could not be used at trial were insufficient to avoid summary judgment.

Eighth Amendment claims

The court treated Suarez’s claims as two Eighth Amendment deliberate-indifference claims: one concerning medical and mental-health care, and another concerning the conditions of his confinement. Both required evidence of a sufficiently serious harm and that each defendant knew about and consciously disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm. The defendants challenged the required state of mind, arguing that Suarez could not show they acted with deliberate indifference.

The court agreed with defendants. It concluded that the undisputed evidence did not make it obvious that Suarez was psychologically decompensating or that any defendant subjectively believed he faced a substantial risk of serious harm.

The court dismissed the claims against Anthony J. Annucci because he did not treat Suarez, was not aware that Suarez was housed in segregated confinement, and was not personally involved in the alleged constitutional violations. As to Robert Morton and Ryan Lahey, the court found that their supervisory roles and interactions with Suarez did not establish that they consciously disregarded a known risk. The court viewed Morton’s decision not to renew Suarez’s deprivation order and his effort to obtain an assisted outpatient treatment order as actions intended to protect Suarez rather than evidence of deliberate indifference.

The court also dismissed the claim against Peter M. Horan. Although Horan knew about Suarez’s serious-mental-illness designation and heard testimony that disciplinary housing was unsuitable for him, Horan sentenced Suarez to time served in the special housing unit, suspended 30 days of keeplock, and stated that he wanted Suarez removed from the special housing unit as soon as the hearing ended. The court concluded that this evidence did not show Horan acted with the required disregard for Suarez’s safety.

The court dismissed the claims against Samantha L. Kulick, Maura L. DiNardo, Abdul Qayyum, Brandon N. Reynolds, and Chesney J. Baker. The court emphasized that Suarez did not tell any Downstate staff that he was hearing voices. The treatment records generally described him as oriented, cooperative, and free of reported hallucinations or suicidal or homicidal thoughts, although some records noted symptoms such as inappropriate smiling and laughter or poor insight and judgment. The court found that Reynolds’s effort to obtain assisted outpatient treatment and Baker’s encouragement that Suarez discuss medication showed protective action, not deliberate indifference. The court stated that any possible professional shortcomings amounted to negligence or a disagreement about judgment, not an Eighth Amendment violation.

New York Correction Law claim

The court also dismissed Suarez’s claim under Section 137(6) of the New York Correction Law. At the relevant time, the law required diversion from segregated confinement to a residential mental-health treatment unit when a person with serious mental illness faced the potential for more than 30 days in segregated confinement. If diversion did not occur, the law required heightened care in certain circumstances.

The court held that Suarez never faced the potential for more than 30 days in segregated confinement as the law defined that term. His disciplinary hearing began and ended within the applicable time limits, and his August 22 sentence immediately removed him from the special housing unit. His 60-day sentence was for keeplock, not segregated confinement under the definition applicable at Downstate. The court therefore concluded that defendants were not required to divert Suarez or provide the statute’s heightened level of care.

Disposition

The court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment. It dismissed Suarez’s Eighth Amendment claims and his claim under Section 137(6) of the New York Correction Law. The court did not address defendants’ qualified-immunity arguments because it found defendants were entitled to judgment on every claim. The Clerk was instructed to terminate the motion and close the case.