Marvin v. Allen

Nature of the document

The provided text is a letter from defense counsel to Judge Kenneth Karas, not a judicial opinion or order. It states the defendants’ arguments concerning Marvin’s motion for judgment on the pleadings and the additional allegations against Marie Pruschki. The text does not state that the court granted or denied either motion.

Background and procedural arguments

The letter says Marvin proceeded without a lawyer and sought judgment on the pleadings, also describing his position as seeking a default judgment because the defendants had not filed an answer. Defense counsel argued that the defendants were not in default because they had appeared, complied with deadlines, and filed a motion to dismiss before an answer was due. Counsel relied on the rule allowing a motion to dismiss before a responsive pleading and on the court’s individual rules, which counsel said stayed the deadline to answer after a pre-motion letter requesting dismissal.

Counsel also argued that judgment on the pleadings was unavailable because such a motion may be made only after the pleadings are closed. The letter further disputed Marvin’s contention that the defendants waived objections to federal subject-matter jurisdiction by allegedly refusing to send tax bills. Counsel cited the rule requiring dismissal whenever the court determines that subject-matter jurisdiction is lacking.

Arguments concerning the additional allegations

The letter asks the court to dismiss the additional allegations against Ms. Pruschki for failure to state a claim. Counsel argued that New York Real Property Tax Law § 922 allows a required tax statement to be mailed or transmitted electronically, and that the statute says failure to mail or receive the statement does not affect the validity of the taxes or interest. The letter therefore contends that § 922 creates no private right to sue and no defense to paying taxes.

Counsel also argued that Marvin could not enforce provisions of New York’s Penal Law because he was not the district attorney and those provisions do not create a private right of action. As to federal racketeering law, counsel said the allegations did not identify predicate acts of racketeering or conduct affecting interstate or foreign commerce.

Finally, counsel maintained that the additional allegations did not cure what the defendants described as a lack of federal subject-matter jurisdiction. The letter argued that Marvin could have challenged the amount of state taxes in state court and that principles governing federal review of state tax disputes barred this federal action, including the asserted claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Requested disposition

The letter asks the court to deny Marvin’s motion for judgment on the pleadings and dismiss the action, including the new allegations against Ms. Pruschki, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and/or 12(b)(6). The provided text does not report Judge Karas’s decision or impose any disposition.