Jones v. Commissioner of Social Security

Background

Cherry Ann Jones sought review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) of the Commissioner of Social Security’s final decision on her application for disability insurance benefits. Jones applied for benefits in February 2021, alleging disability beginning June 29, 2020, based in part on a right shoulder injury and other medical and mental-health conditions.

Administrative law judge Eric Eklund found Jones disabled from June 29, 2020, through August 31, 2021. For that period, he found that she could perform limited light work but could only occasionally reach with her right dominant arm and could never reach overhead. The administrative law judge then found that Jones experienced medical improvement after September 1, 2021. He determined that she could frequently reach with her right arm, although she still could not reach overhead, and found that jobs existed in significant numbers that she could perform. He therefore found her not disabled from September 1, 2021, through the date of his decision. The Appeals Council denied review, making the administrative law judge’s decision final.

Jones’s Arguments

Jones moved for judgment on the pleadings, asking the court to grant benefits or remand the case for further proceedings. Judgment on the pleadings is a decision based on the parties’ written submissions and the administrative record. Jones argued that the administrative law judge improperly used his own nonmedical judgment when determining her residual functional capacity, or RFC—the most she could still do despite her impairments. She also argued that the administrative law judge ignored her testimony that she could not use her right arm.

The Commissioner opposed the motion and argued that the RFC determination was supported by the medical and testimonial evidence.

Court’s Analysis

The court reviewed the administrative law judge’s decision to determine whether it contained legal error or lacked substantial evidence. Substantial evidence means relevant evidence that a reasonable person could accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The court explained that it could not reweigh conflicting evidence when substantial evidence supported the administrative law judge’s findings.

The court held that substantial evidence supported the finding of medical improvement by September 1, 2021. The administrative law judge relied on an August 31, 2021 evaluation by Dr. Guttman, physical-therapy records showing steadily improving shoulder movement, and Dr. Dassa’s February 2022 assessment. Dr. Guttman found that Jones’s shoulder movements were normal or nearly normal, except that she could not lift more than 25 pounds or perform overhead lifting. The physical-therapy records showed nearly normal shoulder movement by February 2022. Jones also told Dr. Dassa that her shoulder improvement had continued.

The court rejected Jones’s argument that the administrative law judge improperly substituted his own medical opinion for the doctors’ opinions. The court explained that an RFC is an administrative finding rather than a medical opinion. The administrative law judge used physicians’ and physical therapists’ measurements of Jones’s shoulder movement and reasonably inferred that improved mobility supported an increased ability to reach.

The court also found it reasonable for the administrative law judge to infer from Dr. Guttman’s statement that Jones could perform all activities of daily living, subject to the stated restrictions, that Jones could frequently reach in ways that were not overhead. The court noted that the RFC addressed evidence that overhead reaching caused problems and that the administrative law judge credited Jones’s reports of pain by including restrictions intended to reduce it.

Although some evidence supported Jones’s claim that she could not frequently reach with her right arm, other evidence supported the administrative law judge’s conclusion. Because a reasonable factfinder could accept the supporting evidence, the court would not reweigh the evidence.

The court also rejected Jones’s argument about her testimony. Although Jones initially answered “Yes” when asked whether she basically had no use of her right arm, she immediately clarified that she could use it but not too much because of pain and other problems. Reading her testimony as a whole, the court concluded that she described limited and painful use rather than complete inability to use the arm. The court further stated that, even if the administrative law judge had not expressly discussed the testimony about complete inability to use the arm, the decision’s reasoning could be understood from the other evidence and findings.

Disposition

Judge Sarah Netburn denied Jones’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. The court dismissed the action with prejudice and directed the Clerk of Court to terminate the motions at ECF Nos. 16 and 18.