Shepperson v. Greenwood Motor Lines, Inc.

Background

Christina Shepperson and the other plaintiffs brought a diversity action against Greenwood Motor Lines, Inc., doing business as R+L Carriers. They alleged claims arising from a rear-end collision in Polk City, Florida, involving a Greenwood tractor-trailer and a personal automobile in which the plaintiffs were passengers. The opinion states that three plaintiffs lived in Bronx County, New York, and one lived in Hillsborough County, Florida. The plaintiffs alleged that Greenwood was an Ohio corporation with its principal place of business in Wilmington, Ohio, was authorized to do business in New York, maintained continuous and systematic contacts with New York, and had about ten New York terminals.

Greenwood moved under Rule 12(b)(2) to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and under Rule 12(b)(3) to dismiss for improper venue. Alternatively, Greenwood requested transfer to the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). The plaintiffs opposed the motion and requested jurisdictional discovery, meaning discovery directed at facts relevant to whether the court had authority over Greenwood.

Analysis

The court held that venue was not proper in the Southern District of New York. Under the federal venue statute, a case may generally be brought where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred. The court found that the collision occurred in Polk City, Florida, within the Middle District of Florida. The court also noted that the case could have been brought in the Southern District of Ohio, where Greenwood has its principal place of business.

The court rejected the plaintiffs’ apparent argument that Greenwood’s New York contacts made venue proper there. It concluded that Greenwood was not subject to general personal jurisdiction in New York because New York was neither Greenwood’s place of incorporation nor its principal place of business, and the plaintiffs had not shown an exceptional case warranting general jurisdiction. The court also concluded that specific personal jurisdiction was not available under New York’s long-arm statute because the injury’s relevant location was the site of the original event—the Florida collision—not where resulting damages may have been felt by a plaintiff. The court found no basis for jurisdictional discovery because the plaintiffs had not made a sufficient initial showing supporting personal jurisdiction in New York.

Transfer and Disposition

Because venue was improper, 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) allowed the court either to dismiss the action or, in the interest of justice, transfer it to a district where it could have been brought. The court chose transfer rather than dismissal. It found that venue was proper in the Middle District of Florida because the collision occurred there and that personal jurisdiction over Greenwood likely existed there under Florida’s long-arm statute and the Constitution. The court stated that Greenwood’s operation of trucks in Florida supplied a constitutionally significant contact with that state.

The court therefore granted Greenwood’s alternative motion and directed the Clerk of Court to transfer the action to the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida. The opinion expressly states that, because the alternative relief was granted, the court did not reach Greenwood’s motions to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(2) or 12(b)(3).