Kelsey v. Kessel
- Philip Halpern
- 7:22-cv-03774
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 10
In Kelsey v. Kessel, Judge Halpern granted the motion to dismiss and dismissed the complaint with prejudice for lack of jurisdiction.
Michael N. Kelsey’s claims against Brittney Kessel were dismissed with prejudice, and the case was closed.
What happened
In Kelsey v. Kessel, Michael N. Kelsey, representing himself, challenged a 2016 order of protection and the New York statute supporting it. He alleged that enforcing the order violated his constitutional rights and sought to invalidate the order and prevent future arrests or prosecutions related to it.
The court concluded that Kelsey did not allege an ongoing violation of federal law or show that Brittney Kessel would enforce the statute against him in the future. It also found that his requested relief mainly concerned past events and therefore did not qualify as proper prospective relief. The court held that the claims were barred by the Eleventh Amendment and that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction.
Judge Halpern granted the motion to dismiss and dismissed the Second Amended Complaint with prejudice, finding that amendment would be futile. The court denied the portion of the motion brought under Rule 12(c), because no answer had been filed, and closed the case.
The detailed version
- Kelsey v. Kessel · No. 7:22-cv-03774
- Philip Halpern
- Mar. 8, 2024
Background
Michael N. Kelsey, proceeding without a lawyer and without paying the filing fee, sued Brittney Kessel under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He alleged violations of his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. His Second Amended Complaint challenged a 2016 order of protection issued under New York Criminal Procedure Law § 530.13. Kelsey sought, among other relief, to invalidate or nullify the order of protection and the statute, and to obtain an injunction against future arrests or prosecutions for violations of that order.
Kelsey alleged that he had mailed legal documents to Lenore Duwe in connection with two lawsuits. He said that a state police investigator later filed an accusatory instrument charging him with violating New York law by sending paperwork to a protected person, and that an arrest warrant was issued. He alleged that the prosecution and enforcement of the order harmed him and violated his constitutional rights.
Motion and Jurisdictional Analysis
Brittney Kessel moved to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a), 12(b)(6), and 12(c). The court explained that the Rule 12(c) branch was inappropriate because the pleadings had not been closed: no answer had been filed. The court therefore denied that branch of the motion.
The court considered Kessel’s claims under Rule 12(h)(3), which requires dismissal whenever the court determines that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. The court analyzed the exception to state sovereign immunity recognized in Ex parte Young. That exception can allow a person to sue a state official for prospective, injunctive relief concerning an ongoing violation of federal law.
The court found that Kessel had not adequately alleged an ongoing violation. He did not allege that he intended to violate the order of protection before it expired, that Brittney Kessel would prosecute him for another violation, or that she would be involved in any future prosecution. The court also found that the complaint focused on isolated events that had already occurred.
The court separately concluded that the requested relief was not properly prospective. The requests to nullify the 2016 order of protection, declare past conduct unconstitutional, and invalidate the statute were based on past events. The court determined that the complaint’s conclusory request to prevent future arrests or prosecutions was insufficient to establish the required basis for prospective relief.
Disposition
The court held that Kessel’s claims were barred by the Eleventh Amendment and that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the action. It did not reach Brittney Kessel’s argument concerning the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because the jurisdictional conclusions already resolved the case.
Judge Philip M. Halpern granted the motion to dismiss and dismissed the Second Amended Complaint with prejudice. The court stated that further amendment would be futile and that Kessel had already received multiple opportunities to amend. The Clerk was directed to terminate the pending motion and close the case.
Read the full 10-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.