Karupaiyan v. Experis IT

Background

Palani Karupaiyan, proceeding without a lawyer, sued Experis US Inc., ManpowerGroup US Inc., Jonas Prising, and Samantha Moore. He alleged unlawful employment discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, the New York State Human Rights Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law.

In 2017, Karupaiyan was working as a contractor for the New York City Department of Education. Experis had a contract with the Department of Education to provide short-term consultant staffing services. Karupaiyan told Samantha Moore, an Experis recruiter, that he wanted to continue working on Department of Education projects. He alleged that defendants later refused to hire him because of protected characteristics.

The court had previously allowed several claims to proceed past defendants’ motion to dismiss. After discovery ended, defendants moved for summary judgment. Summary judgment is granted when the evidence shows that no reasonable jury could find for the opposing party on a legally important issue.

Administrative-exhaustion issues

Defendants argued that Karupaiyan’s claims were not properly exhausted before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and that he filed suit too late after receiving the agency’s notice of the right to sue.

The court declined to grant summary judgment on the general timeliness argument because the evidence conflicted about when Karupaiyan received the right-to-sue notice. Defendants presented evidence that the notice was issued on November 29, 2018, and stamped as received by defendants’ counsel on December 7, 2018. Karupaiyan submitted an affidavit stating that he did not receive it until March 21, 2022. The court also found a factual dispute concerning the timing of Karupaiyan’s eviction that was relevant to his explanation for not receiving the notice earlier.

The court nevertheless granted summary judgment on the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act claims. Karupaiyan’s Equal Employment Opportunity Commission charge did not allege discrimination based on genetic information, and he did not check the charge’s box for genetic discrimination. Independently, the court found no evidence that defendants possessed or considered his genetic information or discriminated against him because of it.

Federal and state discrimination claims

The court held that the claims under Title VII, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and the New York State Human Rights Law required an employer-employee relationship at the time of the alleged discrimination. Those laws protect employees, not independent contractors, for the conduct at issue here.

The undisputed evidence showed that, if the Department of Education selected Karupaiyan, defendants would not have supervised or directed his work, set his duties, provided his work tools, paid him directly, or provided employee benefits. Karupaiyan’s testimony about Experis’s role in recruiting, interviewing, negotiating pay rates, and presenting his resume concerned the pre-employment selection process rather than control over the terms and conditions of employment. The court also found his broader statements about Experis’s authority and responsibility to be unsupported and conclusory.

The court therefore held that defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on these claims because the evidence did not establish the required employment relationship.

New York City Human Rights Law claims

The court separately considered the New York City Human Rights Law, which covered some independent contractors during the relevant period. The court found that the potential contract would have been between the Department of Education and Karupaiyan Consulting, Inc., Karupaiyan’s corporation, and that the corporation would have employed him and received payment.

Because the applicable version of the New York City law protected certain natural persons but not a corporation, the court concluded that Karupaiyan’s potential work arrangement was outside the law’s coverage. His testimony about pay rates and salaries did not provide a basis for finding that he, rather than his corporation, would have been the person hired or paid.

Disposition

The court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment on every remaining claim. It directed the Clerk of Court to close the motions at Docket 100 and close the case.