Mitura v. Finco Services, Inc.

Background

The court previously denied Defendants Finco Services, Inc. d/b/a Current, Stuart Sopp, and Alex Sergiyenko’s motion to compel arbitration. It also granted their motion to dismiss in part and denied it in part. Specifically, the earlier decision dismissed Isabelle Mitura’s retaliation claims under Section 1981, the Equal Pay Act, the New York State Pay Equity Law, the New York State Human Rights Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law.

Mitura moved for reconsideration, arguing that the court had misinterpreted controlling Second Circuit case law. The court explained that reconsideration is an extraordinary remedy generally available only when the court overlooked controlling decisions or important information, when there has been an intervening change in controlling law, when new evidence was previously unavailable, or when correction of a clear error or prevention of serious unfairness is necessary. Reconsideration is not an opportunity to present new arguments or relitigate issues already decided.

Corporate knowledge

Mitura argued that her complaint to an human-resources manager was enough to establish the company’s general knowledge of her protected activity. She relied on Second Circuit precedent stating that a complaint to a corporate officer can establish that knowledge. The defendants responded that Mitura had not alleged that the human-resources manager was a corporate officer.

The court held that the complaint to the human-resources manager, standing alone, was not enough. Although a retaliation plaintiff need not always allege that the individual who took the adverse action personally knew about the protected activity, the complaint must allege facts supporting a reasonable inference that the decisionmaker acted on the instructions of a superior who had the required knowledge. The court found that Mitura had not alleged that Sergiyenko knew about her complaint or that the human-resources manager was Sergiyenko’s superior or directed him to terminate her.

The court also stated that this was not the only reason the retaliation claims had been dismissed. Even if Sergiyenko had known about the complaint, the court said the claims would still have been dismissed because Mitura had not adequately alleged a causal connection between her protected activity and her termination.

Timing and causation

Mitura also argued that the court had disregarded controlling law by concluding that a six-month gap between protected activity and an adverse action was too long, by itself, to support an inference of causation. She relied on Banks v. General Motors, LLC, arguing that the Second Circuit had recognized that six months could support causation.

The court disagreed with Mitura’s reading of Banks. It explained that Banks did not establish a fixed time limit and recognized that a longer gap may support causation when there is additional evidence of retaliation. In Banks, the plaintiff had strong direct evidence linking the adverse action to the protected conduct. Here, the court said Mitura had offered no facts suggesting that Sergiyenko terminated her because of retaliatory animus and relied entirely on timing. The court concluded that six months was too long, standing alone, to support the required inference.

Disposition

The court held that Banks was not an intervening change in controlling law and that Mitura had not shown new evidence, clear error, or a need to prevent serious unfairness. Judge Valerie Caproni therefore denied Mitura’s motion for reconsideration and directed the Clerk of Court to close the motion at Docket Entry 45.