Riordan v. National Executive Council

Background

John J. Riordan, proceeding without a lawyer, brought claims under Sections 101(a)(1), (2), (4), and (5) of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA). The defendant is the National Executive Council (NEC) of the American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO (AFGE). The court treated additional facts in Riordan’s opposition brief as supplementing his complaint and assumed those facts were true for purposes of the motion.

Riordan’s claims arose from a three-year suspension imposed by AFGE Local 3369 on December 16, 2021. He alleged that the suspension was retaliation for raising concerns about financial mismanagement by union leadership, including filing an October 4, 2021 complaint with the Department of Labor reporting an alleged theft of union funds. He alleged that the charges against him, concerning his role in a union election committee a year earlier, were pretextual. He also alleged that the NEC refused to hear his appeal under a policy against considering internal appeals that were also the subject of a complaint to a federal agency. According to Riordan, however, his Department of Labor complaint concerned possible theft of union funds, not the election-related charges underlying his suspension.

Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional motion

AFGE argued that the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because Riordan’s claims were preempted by the Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA). AFGE contended that the CSRA’s administrative remedies were exclusive because Riordan belonged to a local made up entirely of federal employees and to AFGE National, which was composed almost entirely of federal employees.

The court denied the Rule 12(b)(1) motion. It reasoned that “almost entirely” was not the same as “entirely” and that AFGE National was a mixed union containing both public-sector and private-sector members. The court cited decisions holding that the LMRDA gives federal courts jurisdiction over claims involving mixed unions. It also concluded that Riordan did not lose LMRDA protection merely because his local consisted only of government employees. The court further agreed that this complaint was distinct from Riordan’s complaint filed with the Department of Labor.

Rule 12(b)(6) motion

AFGE also moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain enough factual allegations to make a claim for relief plausible. The court construed Riordan’s filings liberally because he was proceeding without a lawyer.

The court concluded that Riordan had stated a facially plausible claim. In particular, it found that he had plausibly alleged that the NEC had no rational basis for refusing to hear his appeal because, even under the NEC’s asserted policy, the Department of Labor complaint did not concern the same subject as the internal appeal. The court also found plausible allegations that the NEC’s refusal to adjudicate the appeal arbitrarily and capriciously denied Riordan rights involving union membership, free speech, and due process, and had a retaliatory or chilling effect on his right to bring judicial or administrative actions.

The court said dismissal was premature because discovery had not begun and relevant facts, including the NEC’s purported policy, were not yet before it. It therefore denied the Rule 12(b)(6) motion.

Disposition

Judge J. Paul Oetken denied AFGE’s motion to dismiss. The order directed AFGE to file an answer within 21 days and directed the clerk to close the motions listed at ECF Nos. 12 and 14. The order did not decide whether Riordan will ultimately prevail on his LMRDA claims.