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S.D.N.Y.Substantive rulingFiled Mar. 29, 2024

Whitehead v. Kijakazi

Judge
Andrew Carter
Docket
1:22-cv-09922
Court
U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
Pages
19
Social SecurityCivil Procedure
In one sentence

In Whitehead v. Kijakazi, Judge Carter affirmed the benefits denial, denying Whitehead’s motion and granting Kijakazi’s motion.

Who this affects

Dunashia N. Whitehead remains denied Social Security disability benefits under the affirmed administrative decision; the Commissioner of Social Security prevailed on the cross-motion for judgment on the pleadings.

What happened

In Whitehead v. Kijakazi, Dunashia N. Whitehead challenged the Social Security Commissioner’s decision that she was not disabled and was not entitled to benefits. She said epilepsy, anxiety, depression, and panic attacks prevented her from working.

Whitehead argued that the administrative judge overlooked limits on her physical and mental abilities, medication side effects, and problems with the job expert’s testimony. The Commissioner defended the decision, which found that Whitehead could do simple work with limits on dangerous equipment, heights, and contact with other people.

Judge Andrew L. Carter, Jr. ruled that the decision was supported by enough evidence and used the correct legal standards. He denied Whitehead’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, granted the Commissioner’s motion, and affirmed the benefits denial.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

Case
Whitehead v. Kijakazi · No. 1:22-cv-09922
Judge
Andrew Carter
Date
Mar. 29, 2024

Background

Dunashia N. Whitehead challenged the Commissioner of Social Security’s final decision finding that she was not disabled and was not entitled to Supplemental Security Income benefits. Whitehead alleged disability beginning August 11, 2020, based on epilepsy, anxiety, depression, and panic attacks. The Social Security Administration denied her application initially and on reconsideration. After a hearing, Administrative Law Judge Mark Solomon found her not disabled, and the Appeals Council denied review.

Whitehead and the Commissioner each moved for judgment on the pleadings, meaning they asked the court to decide the case based on the administrative record and the parties’ written submissions. Whitehead argued that the administrative judge did not adequately assess her abilities function by function, medication side effects, mental limitations, the vocational expert’s testimony, or the hypothetical questions posed to that expert.

Administrative Decision

The administrative judge found that Whitehead had severe seizure, anxiety, and depressive disorders but that none met or equaled a listed impairment. He found that she could perform work at all exertional levels, subject to nonphysical restrictions: no climbing ropes, ladders, or scaffolds; no work at unprotected heights or with hazardous machinery; only simple, repetitive, rote work; and no more than occasional contact with supervisors, coworkers, and the public. Based on vocational expert Tanya M. Edghill’s testimony, he found that jobs such as hand packager, labeler, and document preparer existed in significant numbers in the national economy.

Court’s Analysis

The court reviewed whether substantial evidence supported the Commissioner’s decision and whether the correct legal standards were applied. “Substantial evidence” means relevant evidence that a reasonable person could accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The court stated that it could not replace the Commissioner’s judgment merely because other evidence might support a different result.

The court upheld the step-three findings concerning Whitehead’s mental impairments. It found support for the conclusions that she had moderate, rather than marked or extreme, limitations in concentration, interaction with others, and adapting or managing herself. The court noted evidence that she had intact memory and concentration during examinations, had attended college, could perform daily activities, and could travel by herself or by bus. The court also found that the administrative judge applied the required method for evaluating mental impairments.

The court also upheld the residual functional capacity finding. Regarding physical limitations, the administrative judge considered Whitehead’s seizure history, improvement after medication, lack of recent seizures before the hearing, and medical evidence concerning balance, heavy machinery, and unprotected heights. The court noted that the administrative judge also considered medication side effects and Whitehead’s report that Clobazam did not cause side effects. Regarding mental limitations, the court found support in the treatment record, the absence of psychiatric medication, Whitehead’s activities, and the state-agency psychological consultants’ conclusion that she could perform unskilled work. The court found no inconsistency between the moderate mental limitations and the restrictions to simple work, routine workplace changes, and occasional contact with others.

Finally, the court rejected Whitehead’s challenges to the vocational expert’s testimony. It found that the hypothetical question substantially mirrored the residual functional capacity finding and that the administrative judge was required to identify only one available job satisfying the national-economy requirement. The court therefore did not find reversible error in the vocational evidence.

Disposition

Judge Andrew L. Carter, Jr. denied Whitehead’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, granted the Commissioner’s cross-motion for judgment on the pleadings, and affirmed the Commissioner’s decision.

The authoritative version

Read the full 19-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.

Open opinion PDF →
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