Dickerson v. BPP PCV Owners LLC

Background

Gloria D. Dickerson, proceeding without a lawyer, sued BPP PCV Owners LLC under the Fair Housing Act, the New York State Human Rights Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law. She alleged racial discrimination connected to her housing.

According to the amended complaint, Dickerson is a 74-year-old African American woman who had lived for 30 years at 7 Peter Cooper Road, which the defendant owned. On November 2, 2020, a public safety officer employed by the defendant accused her of removing a cabinet containing a neighbor’s jewelry from the building’s trash. The officer said security cameras showed Dickerson removing it, demanded that she return the jewelry box, and threatened to call the New York City Police Department. Dickerson alleged that the confrontation caused breathing distress and a rapid heartbeat. She later learned that another neighbor’s assistant had taken the cabinet and reported that information to the police.

Dickerson also alleged that the building had a history of refusing to rent to African Americans, that she had experienced racial profiling and mistreatment around the building, and that a public safety officer once asked whether she was a “housemaid.” She characterized the conduct as part of a plan to exclude African Americans from the building.

Fair Housing Act Claim

The court treated the amended complaint as asserting a hostile housing environment claim under the Fair Housing Act. Such a claim requires facts showing that the plaintiff experienced harassment sufficiently severe or pervasive to interfere with the conditions or enjoyment of her residence, that the harassment occurred because of membership in a protected class, and that the landlord can legally be held responsible for the conduct.

The court recognized that Dickerson’s race placed her in a protected class. It nevertheless held that she had not alleged sufficiently severe or pervasive harassment. The court described the confrontation with the public safety officer as distressing, humiliating, and potentially physically threatening, but concluded that the single event was not extraordinarily severe enough by itself to create an intolerable change in her housing conditions. The allegations about other incidents did not establish a sufficiently continuous and coordinated pattern. The court also found that the “housemaid” comment was not alleged to have been racially motivated and did not cause more than a trivial inconvenience.

The court further held that Dickerson had not alleged enough facts to make the landlord responsible for mistreatment by other residents. In particular, she did not allege facts showing that the defendant exercised substantial control over the setting of the resident harassment and over the people who engaged in it.

The court separately held that Dickerson had not adequately alleged discriminatory intent. Although her allegations plausibly connected the officer’s mistaken accusation to the fact that security footage showed a Black woman taking the cabinet, the court found no facts suggesting that the officer acted because of racial hostility. The allegations about the “housemaid” comment and other mistreatment likewise did not establish racial motivation. The court also found that general allegations about historical discrimination at the housing complex and Dickerson being the only African American resident of her building did not provide the required minimal support for a claim of discriminatory intent.

For these reasons, the court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss Dickerson’s Fair Housing Act claims for failure to state a claim.

State and City Claims

After dismissing the federal claims, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction—the authority to hear related state-law claims—in connection with any claims Dickerson might be asserting under the New York State Human Rights Law or the New York City Human Rights Law. The court noted that Dickerson had not expressly identified state or city housing-discrimination claims but construed the amended complaint liberally because she was proceeding without a lawyer.

Leave to Amend and Disposition

The court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss the amended complaint in its entirety. It also granted Dickerson one final opportunity to amend her complaint to correct the identified deficiencies in her housing-discrimination claims. Any second amended complaint had to be filed within 45 days after entry of the order and would completely replace, rather than supplement, the existing amended complaint. The court stated that if Dickerson did not amend within that period, the action would be dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim without further advance notice. The order resolved docket entry 47.