Godfryd v. City of Newburgh

Background

Elka Gotfryd served as the City Planner for the City of Newburgh from February 2020 through March 9, 2021. Alexandra Church was the City’s Director of Planning and Development and Gotfryd’s direct supervisor, and Joseph Donat was the City Manager.

Gotfryd alleged that the defendants terminated her because she advocated for anti-racist and anti-displacement policies and objected to discriminatory language and practices. The speech identified in the case included:

- proposed anti-racist and anti-displacement goals for a housing-needs assessment; - a June 2020 email to members of the Newburgh Housing Coalition containing draft working goals for her work as City Planner; - emails criticizing language and approaches discussed at a meeting about the City’s Code Sweeps program; and - a grant application and related letter concerning the racial composition of the City’s Architectural Review Commission.

Gotfryd brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging retaliation in violation of the First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment. She also asserted a claim against the City under the rule allowing municipal liability for constitutional violations caused by a municipal policy or custom.

First Amendment Claim

The defendants moved for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence shows no genuine dispute over a fact that could affect the result and the moving party is entitled to judgment under the law.

For a public employee to prevail on a First Amendment retaliation claim, the speech must be constitutionally protected, the employer must have taken an adverse action, and the speech must have caused that action. The court focused on whether Gotfryd spoke as a private citizen or as part of her official job duties. Under the governing rule, public employees generally do not receive First Amendment protection for statements made pursuant to their official responsibilities.

The court found that Gotfryd’s statements were made as part of her work as City Planner. She reviewed and revised the housing-needs assessment scope of work as a City assignment, prepared Coalition materials connected to her work, participated in the Code Sweeps meeting as City Planner and communicated with her supervisor about the Department’s work, and submitted the grant application on behalf of the Department. The court also relied on Gotfryd’s own statements connecting her advocacy to her role and responsibilities.

The court rejected Gotfryd’s argument that the defendants treated her advocacy as outside her job duties. It concluded that the record showed her speech was part of her concerns about how she and the Department could perform their work. The court therefore held that her speech was not protected by the First Amendment and granted the defendants summary judgment on that claim.

Fourteenth Amendment Claim

Gotfryd alleged that the defendants violated the Fourteenth Amendment by terminating her because she opposed discriminatory language and practices, advocated for minority communities, and associated positively with minority leaders. The court concluded that this claim arose from the same factual allegations as the First Amendment retaliation claim.

Because courts in the Second Circuit generally do not allow an equal-protection retaliation claim to proceed when it duplicates a First Amendment retaliation claim that has been dismissed, the court dismissed Gotfryd’s Fourteenth Amendment retaliation claim as derivative and duplicative of the First Amendment claim.

Municipal-Liability Claim

A municipality may be liable under § 1983 when a municipal policy, custom, or practice causes a violation of federal law. But municipal liability requires an underlying constitutional violation. Because the court dismissed Gotfryd’s First and Fourteenth Amendment claims, it also dismissed her claim against the City based on municipal liability.

Disposition

The court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. It dismissed Gotfryd’s causes of action in their entirety, directed the Clerk to enter judgment for the defendants, and terminated the action. The opinion does not state that the dismissal was with or without prejudice.