Taylor v. Small
- Nelson Roman
- 7:22-cv-02762
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 14
In Taylor v. Small, Judge Roman granted dismissal of Taylor’s medical-care lawsuit, but allowed her to amend it.
Taliyah Taylor’s amended federal civil-rights claims against Dr. Michelle Small and the other named defendants were dismissed without prejudice, with permission to amend; the defendants’ motion to dismiss was granted.
What happened
In Taylor v. Small, Taliyah Taylor, who was incarcerated, sued medical and correctional officials under a federal civil-rights law, claiming constitutionally inadequate treatment for recurring urinary infections and related conditions. She alleged delays, denied requests, medication problems, and disagreements about testing and treatment.
The defendants asked the court to dismiss the amended complaint. The court ruled that Taylor had not plausibly alleged that three supervisory officials were personally involved and had not shown that the medical care or delays met the constitutional standard for inadequate care. The court noted that she received repeated examinations, medications, specialist referrals, and testing.
Judge Roman granted the motion to dismiss and dismissed all claims without prejudice, meaning Taylor was allowed to file another amended complaint. The court set May 15, 2024, as the deadline for that filing and stated that claims dismissed without prejudice could become dismissed with prejudice if she did not timely amend without showing good cause.
The detailed version
- Taylor v. Small · No. 7:22-cv-02762
- Nelson Roman
- Apr. 11, 2024
Background
Taliyah Taylor, proceeding without a lawyer and incarcerated at Bedford Hills Correctional Facility, brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. She alleged that staff members employed by the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision violated the Eighth Amendment by acting with deliberate indifference to her medical needs.
Taylor alleged that she experienced recurring urinary tract infections beginning in February 2020. She described delays in specialist appointments, diagnostic testing, and medications; denials of requested treatments; problems with medication dosages and delivery; and disagreements with medical staff about treatment for urinary and gynecological conditions. She also alleged that she filed grievances and appealed them to Superintendent Eileen Russell, and that she wrote to other officials about medical delays.
The defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). They raised several grounds, including failure to state a claim, immunity defenses, and lack of administrative exhaustion. Because the court found that Taylor failed to state a plausible claim, it did not address the defendants’ other grounds for dismissal.
Claims Against Supervisory Officials
The court first ruled that Taylor did not adequately allege personal involvement by Commissioner Thomas J. Loughren, Deputy Superintendent of Health McCarthy, or Superintendent Eileen Russell. Section 1983 generally requires a plaintiff to connect each defendant’s own actions to the alleged constitutional violation; a person’s supervisory position or place in a chain of command is not enough.
As to Commissioner Loughren, the court found that Taylor alleged no facts showing that he knew about her medical condition, reviewed or denied her grievances or requests, or participated in decisions about her care. As to Deputy Superintendent McCarthy, Taylor alleged that she complained about medical requests and combined medication pills, and that McCarthy responded. The court held that receiving or responding to such complaints did not adequately establish personal involvement in a constitutional violation.
As to Superintendent Russell, Taylor alleged that Russell denied appeals of her medical grievances. The court explained that denying a grievance can sometimes show personal involvement when the response is detailed and shows knowledge of the alleged violation, but found that Taylor alleged only that Russell received and denied her grievances. The court therefore dismissed the claims against these three officials for lack of adequately alleged personal involvement.
Eighth Amendment Medical-Care Claim
To state an Eighth Amendment medical-indifference claim, Taylor had to plausibly allege both an objectively serious medical need and that a defendant acted with deliberate indifference—that is, a sufficiently culpable awareness of and disregard for the need for medical care. The court emphasized that disagreement with a treatment choice, negligence, or unsuccessful treatment ordinarily does not establish a constitutional violation when the care provided was adequate.
The court concluded that Taylor’s amended complaint showed that she was examined numerous times, received antibiotics and other medications, was referred to outside specialists, and underwent diagnostic testing, including a CT scan and an in-camera inspection. Although Taylor alleged that treatment was unsuccessful, delayed, or different from what she preferred, the court found no sufficient allegation that the defendants consciously ignored her complaints or refused to treat her condition.
The court also found that Taylor did not adequately allege that the treatment delays caused a sufficiently serious injury. Although she identified periods between recommendations and performance of procedures or receipt of medications, she did not specifically explain how those delays caused an injury serious enough to support an Eighth Amendment claim. The court therefore dismissed the medical-indifference claim for failure to state a claim.
Disposition and Amendment
Judge Nelson S. Roman granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The court dismissed all of Taylor’s claims without prejudice and granted her leave to file a second amended complaint concerning claims that had not been dismissed with prejudice. The deadline was May 15, 2024, and the defendants were directed to answer or otherwise respond by June 5, 2024. The court stated that claims dismissed without prejudice could be deemed dismissed with prejudice if Taylor did not timely file a second amended complaint and could not show good cause for the failure.
Read the full 14-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.