Delgado v. Donald J. Trump For President, Inc.

Background

Arlene Delgado, proceeding without a lawyer, sued Donald J. Trump For President, Inc., Sean Spicer, Reince Priebus, and Stephen Bannon. Her amended complaint alleges, among other things, breach of contract, tortious interference with economic advantage, pregnancy discrimination, sex and gender discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation.

The case was referred to Magistrate Judge Katherine H. Parker for general pretrial management. Judge Parker originally set a fact-discovery deadline of January 31, 2023, and the deadline was extended at least four times. Delgado’s lawyer withdrew on December 19, 2023, and Delgado then proceeded without counsel. On January 31, 2024, Judge Parker extended discovery to April 15, 2024, to allow Delgado to complete certain discovery that her former lawyer had not completed. Judge Parker permitted Delgado to serve subpoenas on Eric Trump and Brad Parscale and required her to seek permission for additional third-party discovery.

On February 27, 2024, Delgado asked to take 16 depositions of people who were not parties to the case. On March 1, 2024, Judge Parker allowed four depositions involving information relevant to Delgado’s contract and discrimination claims, the defendants’ employment decisions, and the defense that Delgado was unqualified for a White House position. Judge Parker denied permission for the other 12 depositions, finding that the requested discovery was cumulative or duplicative of information from documents, party depositions, and the limited third-party discovery already allowed.

Delgado’s Objections

Delgado argued that she did not need the court’s permission to take the depositions because she had not yet used the ten depositions generally allowed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(a). She also argued that Judge Parker wrongly denied permission for the other 12 depositions and should have granted her an additional 30 days of discovery.

Court’s Analysis

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(a), a district judge may change a magistrate judge’s order on a non-dispositive matter only if the order is clearly erroneous or contrary to law. The standard is highly deferential, and magistrate judges have broad discretion to resolve discovery disputes.

Judge Torres rejected Delgado’s argument about the ten-deposition limit. The court explained that discovery must be limited when it would be unreasonably cumulative or duplicative or would impose an undue burden. Given the repeated extensions of discovery, Judge Torres held that it was not clearly erroneous for Judge Parker to require Delgado to show that proposed non-party depositions were relevant and proportional to the needs of the case before allowing them.

Judge Torres also upheld the denial of the 12 additional depositions. The court concluded that Judge Parker reasonably found the depositions cumulative or duplicative of existing and permitted discovery. The court added that a person’s possible possession of discoverable information does not create an unlimited right to take that person’s deposition.

The request for 30 more days of discovery was moot because Judge Parker had extended fact discovery to May 7, 2024. Judge Torres nevertheless stated that the March 1 order was not clearly erroneous because scheduling changes require good cause and the judge’s consent, and Judge Parker had broad discretion over the schedule.

Disposition

Judge Torres overruled Delgado’s objections and denied her request to modify the March 1 order. The opinion did not decide the underlying contract, discrimination, retaliation, or other claims.