Kanayama v. Kowal

Background

The Government of Japan requested Masahide Kanayama’s extradition so that he could face two charges under Article 260 of the Japanese Criminal Code. Japan alleged that, on March 25, 2015, Kanayama used an oily liquid to deface portions of the Narita-san Shinsho-ji Temple and the Katori Jingu Shrine. Japan alleged approximately $21,300 in damage.

On January 26, 2023, Judge Edgardo Ramos certified to the Secretary of State that Kanayama was extraditable. Judge Ramos found that Japan had shown both dual criminality—meaning that the charged conduct was criminal in Japan and the United States and could result in more than one year of imprisonment—and probable cause, meaning sufficient evidence to support a reasonable belief that Kanayama committed the offenses.

Kanayama then petitioned for review under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. He challenged the findings on dual criminality and probable cause, largely repeating arguments presented to Judge Ramos. He also raised humanitarian arguments, including claimed risks arising from his Christian missionary activities and the asserted likelihood that the conduct would not have been prosecuted as a felony in New York.

Evidence and Legal Issues

The record included surveillance footage from both sites, toll and travel records, a rental-car record connecting Kanayama to a gray Toyota Prius, hotel records, flight records, and a facial-comparison report. The evidence placed a person resembling Kanayama at both sites around the relevant times, showed that a person in similar clothing traveled between them, and connected Kanayama to the vehicle and later hotel stay. The record also included videos in which Kanayama discussed applying oil to Japanese shrines for religious purposes.

For dual criminality, the court compared the alleged conduct—not merely the names of the offenses—in Japan and New York. It concluded that intentionally applying oil to the temple and shrine, causing more than $250 in damage, could constitute criminal mischief in the third degree under New York Penal Law § 145.05. The court rejected Kanayama’s argument that religious motivation defeated the required intent, explaining that motive and intent are different and that intent would ordinarily be decided by a factfinder at trial.

The court also rejected the argument that the properties suffered no legally sufficient damage. Repair estimates from restoration companies placed the cost of repairs above the New York statutory threshold. The fact that repairs had not been performed, that the visible stains had faded, or that the sites had not lost their function did not eliminate the alleged damage for purposes of the extradition proceeding.

For probable cause, the court emphasized that the extradition proceeding was not a trial and did not determine guilt or innocence. The court could rely on the requesting country’s authenticated materials, including hearsay, and Kanayama’s contrary expert evidence raised disputes about the reliability of Japan’s proof but did not defeat the probable-cause finding. The court also agreed that the extradition judge properly refused to treat Kanayama’s expert material as contradictory evidence that would require choosing between competing credibility accounts.

Humanitarian Arguments and Ruling

The court held that claims about persecution, prison conditions, the fairness of Japan’s criminal process, and the likelihood of prosecution in New York were matters for the Secretary of State. They were not grounds for the court to deny the extradition request in this habeas proceeding.

Judge McMahon denied Kanayama’s petition. She concluded that the charged conduct satisfied the treaty’s dual-criminality requirement and that the evidence was more than sufficient to support probable cause. The court also declined to issue a certificate of appealability because Kanayama had not made the required substantial showing that a constitutional right had been denied, and it found that an appeal would not be taken in good faith under the cited statute.