Goldson v. Department of Corrections, NYC

Background

Derwin Goldson was detained at the Eric M. Taylor Center on Rikers Island and represented himself. He sued the City of New York and three unidentified correctional officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal law allowing claims against state actors who violate constitutional rights. He alleged problems involving mold, water, toilets, food, recreation, pests, clothing, ceilings, bedding, mail, discovery materials, and his criminal case's speedy-trial proceedings.

The court had previously given Goldson permission to amend his original complaint. In the amended complaint, he named the City, a John Doe correction officer, a John Doe captain, and a John Doe warden. He sought money damages and orders requiring the facility to provide missing mail and close the facility until it was safe and livable.

Claims Against the City

The court dismissed the claims against the City because Goldson again did not allege facts showing that a City policy, custom, or practice caused a constitutional violation. The court allowed him to replead those claims if he could provide facts supporting municipal liability.

Conditions of Confinement

Because Goldson appeared to be a pretrial detainee, the court evaluated his conditions-of-confinement claims under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. He needed to allege both that the conditions created an unreasonable risk of serious harm and that a defendant intentionally imposed the conditions or recklessly failed to take reasonable steps after knowing, or having reason to know, of the risk.

The court concluded that allegations about cold food and receiving beans or a vegetable patty instead of meat protein because of a seafood allergy did not show an objectively serious health risk. The allegation that toilets spit back when flushed did not identify what was expelled or how often Goldson was exposed to it. More generally, Goldson did not allege facts showing that any particular defendant knew or should have known about a serious condition and failed to address it. The court dismissed these claims for failure to state a claim but allowed Goldson to replead them with facts addressing both required elements.

Mail and Access to the Courts

The court treated Goldson's allegations about missing mail and discovery materials as potentially raising two First Amendment claims: denial of access to the courts and mail tampering.

For access to the courts, Goldson needed to allege deliberate and malicious conduct that caused actual injury to a nonfrivolous legal claim. He alleged that he never received his discovery file, but did not clearly allege that a mail problem caused this, that a defendant deliberately and maliciously interfered with his mail, or that the missing materials hindered a valid underlying legal claim. He also did not explain why counsel could not raise any issues from the discovery materials in his criminal case. The court dismissed the claim but allowed him to replead it by naming the individual officers involved and providing additional facts.

For mail tampering, Goldson needed to allege regular and unjustified interference with his mail, or interference that affected his access to the courts or legal representation. His allegation that he had mail he never received did not meet that standard, and he did not allege that any identified defendant was directly involved. The court dismissed the mail-tampering claim but allowed him to replead it with additional facts.

Speedy-Trial Claims

Goldson alleged that he was never granted relief under New York Criminal Procedure Law § 30.30. The court explained that this state-law provision does not itself create a federal constitutional right and therefore cannot support a § 1983 claim. Goldson also did not allege facts showing a violation of the federal constitutional right to a speedy trial. The court dismissed the speedy-trial claims but allowed him to replead constitutional claims.

State-Law Claims and Disposition

Because the court dismissed all claims within its original federal jurisdiction, it declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction—the power to hear related state-law claims—over any state-law claims Goldson might be asserting.

The court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), but granted Goldson 30 days to file a second amended complaint. If he did not do so within that period, the court stated that the Clerk would be directed to enter judgment. The court also certified that an appeal would not be taken in good faith and denied fee-free appeal status.