Morris v. New York Housing Urban Development

Background

Keith S. Morris, appearing without a lawyer, sued on his own behalf and attempted to sue on behalf of Paladino Cash Tow Rescue, Inc. He named “New York Housing Urban Development, a/k/a New York Convention Center, d/b/a Empire State Development,” the Social Security Administration, former Social Security Commissioner Andre Saul, the United States of America, Administrative Law Judges Roxanne Fuller and Oluwato Akinrolabu, “OTDA, 14 Borum Pl.,” Barbara H. Quinn, Lorelei Salas, “Department of Labor Secretary Allison Johnson,” and the New York City Housing Authority.

Morris invoked federal-question jurisdiction and referred to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985(3). His allegations included discrimination based on being an “ex convict,” denial of a tow-license renewal, defamation, malicious prosecution, problems involving a May 20, 2020 hearing, Social Security benefits, unsafe conditions, and alleged conspiracies among defendants. He sought joint and several damages of $2,100,000.

The court had previously granted Morris permission to proceed without prepaying filing fees. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the court was required to dismiss claims that were frivolous, malicious, failed to state a claim, or sought money from an immune defendant. The court also had to dismiss claims over which it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction.

Rule 8 and Claims on Behalf of Paladino Cash Tow Rescue, Inc.

The court held that the complaint did not satisfy Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because it consisted largely of conclusory statements and did not provide a short and plain statement showing that Morris was entitled to relief. The court granted leave to file an amended complaint that complies with Rule 8.

The court separately dismissed, without prejudice, any claims Morris asserted on behalf of Paladino Cash Tow Rescue, Inc. It held that a nonlawyer may represent only himself, and that a corporation or other artificial entity must appear through a licensed attorney.

Claims Against the United States and Andre Saul

The court treated Morris’s constitutional allegations against Saul as claims under an implied cause of action recognized in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics. Such claims may be brought against an individual federal officer in a personal capacity, not against a federal agency or an official in an official capacity.

Because Morris did not allege facts showing Saul’s personal involvement, the court construed the claims against Saul as official-capacity claims. It held that sovereign immunity barred the monetary claims against the United States and Saul and dismissed those claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii). The court also declined to construe the complaint as a Federal Tort Claims Act action because Morris did not allege facts suggesting that a federal employee committed a tort against him or that he exhausted the required administrative remedies.

Social Security Administration Claims

The Social Security Act permits federal-court review of a final decision by the Commissioner of Social Security made after a hearing. The court held that Morris did not allege that he had completed the Social Security administrative process or received a final decision from the Commissioner. He also did not allege facts showing that exhaustion should be excused.

The court therefore held that Morris’s Social Security benefits claims could not proceed at that time because the complaint did not establish jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Because the status of those claims was unclear, the court granted leave to amend so Morris could allege either that he exhausted the administrative process or facts supporting an excuse from exhaustion.

Judicial Immunity

The court held that judges and administrative law judges are generally absolutely immune from damages claims for acts within their judicial responsibilities. Morris did not allege facts showing that Fuller or Akinrolabu acted outside their judicial roles or jurisdiction. The court therefore dismissed the claims against Fuller and Akinrolabu as seeking monetary relief from immune defendants and, consequently, as frivolous under the fee-waiver screening statute.

Eleventh Amendment Immunity and Personal Involvement

The court held that New York’s Eleventh Amendment immunity barred Morris’s claims under Section 1983 against New York Housing Urban Development and OTDA. Those claims were dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii).

As to Quinn, Salas, and Johnson, the court held that a Section 1983 claim requires facts showing each defendant’s direct and personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation. Morris did not allege how those defendants were personally involved, so the court dismissed those claims for failure to state a claim. The court granted leave to amend those claims with facts showing each defendant’s personal involvement.

Disposition

The court dismissed the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii), with 30 days’ leave to replead. The order did not state that the entire action was dismissed with prejudice. The court certified that an appeal would not be taken in good faith and denied fee-waiver status for purposes of an appeal. It directed the Clerk of Court to keep the matter open until a civil judgment is entered. Judge Laura Taylor Swain signed the order.