Doolittle v. Bloomberg L.P.

Background

Abigail Doolittle had served Mark Crumpton with a deposition notice. The parties could not agree on when or how the deposition should occur, so Crumpton moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) for a protective order delaying his deposition for six months. A protective order is a court order limiting discovery to protect a person from undue burden or other specified harm.

Crumpton submitted declarations from two treating physicians, his brother, and his attorney. The court sealed unredacted versions of the medical materials and the parties’ briefs because they contained sensitive medical information. Bloomberg L.P. submitted a letter supporting Crumpton’s motion. After the court directed the parties to discuss possible accommodations, they reported that they could not agree on accommodations that would permit the deposition to proceed.

Court’s analysis

The court explained that the person seeking a protective order must show good cause through a specific factual demonstration. It found that Crumpton met that burden. His doctors’ sworn declarations stated that he could not communicate effectively at that time and that testifying could further damage his health. The declarations also described possible cognitive difficulties affecting his ability to remember, speak, or understand questions.

The court rejected Doolittle’s argument that the medical declarations were conclusory or speculative. It found that the declarations gave more specific medical explanations than declarations that other courts had found insufficient. The court also emphasized that Crumpton was seeking only a temporary delay, not a permanent prohibition on his deposition.

The court concluded that Doolittle’s proposed accommodations—including breaks, remote participation, and shorter questioning—would not resolve the doctors’ concerns. It also found that Doolittle had not shown that the temporary delay would cause significant and undue prejudice.

Ruling and effect

The opinion states that the motion was granted in part. The court entered a temporary protective order preventing Doolittle from deposing Crumpton for 120 days, meaning that the deposition could occur on or after September 3, 2024. By that date, Crumpton must meet and confer with Doolittle about rescheduling and submit a joint letter about the dispute and proposed next steps. If he continued to claim that good cause supported preventing the deposition, he would have to provide information about his medical condition and specific, detailed evidence from his doctors.

Expert discovery was to continue, with a scheduled closing date of July 12, 2024. The court adjourned the post-discovery pretrial conference without setting a new date. Because the court had not made a final determination about the deposition, it declined at that time to decide Doolittle’s request to bar Crumpton from submitting affidavits on a later summary-judgment motion or testifying at trial.

The final order states that Crumpton’s motion for a protective order temporarily preventing his deposition was granted under the stated conditions. Judge Jennifer L. Rochon signed the order.