Tull v. Higgins
- Donna Ryu
- 4:21-cv-01566
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 29
In Tull v. Higgins, Judge Ryu partly granted Higgins’s dismissal and striking motions, allowing the harassment claims to continue.
Jasha Tull, Herman Tull, and Lekha Tull may amend their dismissed defamation and stalking claims, while their harassment claims continue; Michaela Higgins obtained partial dismissal and striking relief.
What happened
In Tull v. Higgins, Jasha Tull and his parents, Herman Tull and Lekha Tull, alleged that Michaela Higgins and unidentified defendants defamed, harassed, and stalked them through communications and social media posts.
The court dismissed Jasha’s and Lekha’s defamation claims and all three stalking claims, allowing amendment. It denied dismissal of the harassment claims. It also granted in part and denied in part the motion to strike Jasha’s allegations, and granted the motion to strike portions of Herman and Lekha’s complaint.
Judge Donna Ryu ruled that the complaints needed more specific allegations about defamation, intent, and stalking, and ordered amended complaints within 14 days while requiring removal of the references to Higgins’s alleged OnlyFans account.
The detailed version
- Tull v. Higgins · No. 4:21-cv-01566
- Donna Ryu
- Dec. 27, 2021
Background
These related cases were brought by Jasha Tull and his parents, Herman Tull and Lekha Tull, against Michaela Higgins, also identified as Caeli La, and ten unidentified defendants. The plaintiffs alleged defamation, civil harassment under California Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6, and civil stalking under California Civil Code section 1708.7. Jasha asserted defamation, harassment, and stalking claims. Herman and Lekha asserted harassment and stalking claims, and Lekha also asserted defamation.
The complaints alleged that Higgins made threatening and allegedly false statements about Jasha, including accusations involving rape, sexual misconduct, drug use, and mental disorders. The complaints also alleged repeated communications and social-media activity directed at Jasha, Herman, and Lekha. Higgins moved to dismiss the complaints under Rule 12(b)(6), which tests whether the pleadings adequately state legally recognized claims. She also moved to strike portions of both complaints under Rule 12(f), which allows a court to remove redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous material.
Motions to Dismiss
The court held that Jasha had not adequately pleaded the “actual malice” required for a public figure’s defamation claim. Actual malice requires facts supporting that the defendant knew a statement was false or recklessly disregarded whether it was true. The court found Jasha’s allegations about Higgins’s knowledge and state of mind conclusory and found that alleged hostility or ill will, without more, did not establish actual malice. The court dismissed Jasha’s defamation claim with leave to amend facts supporting actual malice.
The court also dismissed Lekha’s defamation claim with leave to amend. The complaint quoted a lengthy social-media post but did not identify the specific statements alleged to be false and defamatory. Without that information, the court could not evaluate Higgins’s argument that the statements were nonactionable opinions.
The court denied Higgins’s motion to dismiss the harassment claims brought by Jasha, Herman, and Lekha. The plaintiffs alleged repeated unwanted communications, false accusations, emotional distress, and conduct serving no legitimate purpose. Higgins argued that her conduct served legitimate purposes, including seeking accountability and addressing alleged sexual misconduct. The court held that the parties’ competing accounts created factual disputes that could not be resolved at the pleading stage.
The court dismissed Jasha’s stalking claim with leave to amend. Although his allegations could support an inference that Higgins’s statements and a social-media photograph showing her with a firearm caused reasonable fear, he did not allege facts showing that Higgins made the statements or posted the photograph with the intent to place him in reasonable fear.
The court dismissed Herman and Lekha’s stalking claims with leave to amend for the same failure to allege the required intent. It also found an additional deficiency: they did not allege that they clearly and definitively demanded that Higgins stop her conduct, and they did not contest that point in their opposition.
Motions to Strike
The court granted the motion to strike the references in both complaints to Higgins’s alleged pseudonym on OnlyFans.com. The complaints did not identify any challenged conduct or defamatory statements connected to that platform, making the references immaterial and impertinent as pleaded.
The court denied the portion of the motion to strike Jasha’s allegations concerning statements that he was a psychopath or had a personality disorder and concerning retweets by Higgins’s account. Higgins argued that those statements could not support defamation claims, but the court held that a motion to strike was not the proper way to obtain dismissal of claims on that basis.
Accordingly, the motions to dismiss were granted in part and denied in part. Jasha’s defamation and stalking claims were dismissed with leave to amend; Lekha’s defamation claim was dismissed with leave to amend; Herman and Lekha’s stalking claims were dismissed with leave to amend; and the motions to dismiss the harassment claims were denied. Higgins’s motion to strike portions of Jasha’s complaint was granted in part and denied in part, and her motion to strike portions of Herman and Lekha’s complaint was granted. Judge Donna Ryu ordered the plaintiffs to file amended complaints within 14 days and to omit the stricken OnlyFans.com references.
Read the full 29-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.