Sanderlin v. City of San Jose

Background

Eight plaintiffs sued the City of San Jose, eight named police officers, and unnamed officers over the police response to protests in San Jose from May 29 through June 2, 2020. The plaintiffs alleged violations of the First and Fourth Amendments and California statutory and common law. Their allegations included indiscriminate use of rubber bullets, foam batons, bean-bag rounds, tear gas, and other less-lethal weapons; confining protesters by surrounding them; and arresting or using force against protesters and a legal observer.

The plaintiffs asserted claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which allows claims against government officials for violating federal rights; California’s Bane Act; intentional infliction of emotional distress; loss of consortium; and claims against the City under Monell. Monell liability is a form of municipal liability for constitutional violations caused by an official policy, custom, failure to train, or ratification by a final policymaker.

The defendants moved to dismiss some claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint states a legally sufficient claim. They also asserted qualified immunity, a protection that can shield government officials from damages unless the complaint alleges a violation of a constitutional right that was clearly established when the conduct occurred.

Rulings on Individual Defendants and Federal Claims

The plaintiffs agreed to dismiss claims by Shante Thomas, Vera Clanton, and Joseph Stukes against Captain Jason Dwyer. The court granted that part of the motion, and claims 6, 7, 8, 14, and 15 were dismissed without prejudice as to Captain Dwyer.

The plaintiffs also agreed to dismiss Pietro di Donato’s claims against Officer Jared Yuen because they had not alleged that Yuen caused di Donato’s injury. The court granted that part of the motion, and claims 4, 12, 23, and 31 were dismissed without prejudice as to Yuen. The court stated that those claims could be asserted against Officer Doe 2 in an amended complaint, and that Doe 2 had to be identified.

The court denied the motion to dismiss all claims against Chief Edgardo Garcia in his personal capacity. It found that the allegations plausibly connected Garcia to the alleged injuries because he allegedly controlled police policies and training, authorized crowd-control tactics, and approved policy changes allowing greater use of less-lethal weapons shortly before the protests.

The court denied dismissal of the plaintiffs’ First Amendment claims, claims 1 through 8. It found that the plaintiffs plausibly alleged that they engaged in protected protest activity, that the police conduct could deter a person of ordinary firmness from continuing that activity, and that the plaintiffs’ speech or viewpoint may have been a substantial or motivating factor in the police response.

The court also denied the defendants’ qualified-immunity argument as to the First Amendment claims. At the pleading stage, the court could not conclude that the defendants were entitled to immunity because the plaintiffs alleged that police used force against largely peaceful protesters in response to anti-police and anti-excessive-force expression. The court stated that the defendants could raise qualified immunity later in the case.

As to Captain Dwyer, the court denied dismissal of all federal claims based on pleading sufficiency and qualified immunity. For the Fourth Amendment claims, the court found that the allegations plausibly showed that plaintiffs were seized because officers allegedly used physical force intended to restrain them, including projectiles that significantly impaired their movement. The court also found that the allegations plausibly showed excessive force under the circumstances described in the complaint, including the plaintiffs’ alleged lack of violence or immediate threat and the injuries caused by the weapons.

The court concluded that the alleged right was clearly established enough, at this stage, to deny Dwyer qualified immunity. It compared the allegations to Ninth Circuit precedent involving a protester who was hit by a projectile, rendered immobile, and subjected to excessive force. The court emphasized that this qualified-immunity ruling was based only on the complaint and did not prevent Dwyer from raising the defense later.

The court denied dismissal of the federal claims against the unnamed Doe officers. It found that identifying those officers through discovery was not yet impossible or clearly futile. The plaintiffs’ counsel had represented that attorneys and paralegals were reviewing video footage produced by the City to identify the officers. The court required the plaintiffs to name the Doe defendants in an amended complaint by June 3, 2022, warning that failure to do so would result in dismissal of the Doe defendants.

State-Law Claims and Municipal Liability

The court denied dismissal of Cayla Sanderlin’s Bane Act claim. The court found that her allegations—including alleged confinement by police lines, projectiles fired in her direction, and exposure to tear gas while trying to help her injured husband—were sufficient at this stage to allege interference through threats, intimidation, or coercion.

The court denied the defendants’ statutory-immunity challenge to the state-law claims against the City and Doe defendants. It reasoned that the cited California immunities do not protect officers from liability for unreasonable force and that the City could not obtain immunity on the asserted basis when the Doe defendants themselves were not entitled to that immunity.

The court denied dismissal of the three Monell claims against the City, claims 17 through 19. It rejected the plaintiffs’ theory that the complaint adequately alleged a widespread unconstitutional custom or policy based only on the events surrounding these protests, explaining that the complaint did not allege earlier examples showing a persistent and widespread practice. But the court found that the plaintiffs plausibly alleged municipal liability based on failure to train and ratification. In particular, the complaint alleged that the City changed its policy to permit less-lethal weapons for crowd control shortly before the protests without adequately training officers for that use, and that Chief Garcia directed or ratified the police response.

Disposition

The court granted in part and denied in part the defendants’ motion to dismiss. It dismissed the specified claims against Captain Dwyer and Officer Yuen without prejudice. It denied the remaining dismissal requests identified in the order, including those concerning Chief Garcia, the First Amendment claims, Captain Dwyer’s remaining federal claims, the Doe defendants, Cayla Sanderlin’s Bane Act claim, the challenged state-law claims, and the Monell claims.

The plaintiffs were required to file an amended complaint by June 3, 2022. The order stated that failure to comply would result in dismissal of deficient claims with prejudice and that new claims or parties could not be added without permission or the defendants’ consent.