Mullin v. City of Mountain View, California

Background

Tyghe James Mullin, proceeding without a lawyer, brought a civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City of Mountain View, California, and individual police officers of the Mountain View Police Department. His second amended complaint alleged that officers tracked an Apple AirTag registered to another person and then searched his private storage unit at Public Storage without a warrant. He alleged violations of the Fourth Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the First Amendment, as well as municipal liability against the city. He also asserted state-law claims.

Mullin had pleaded no contest as part of a plea agreement and was sentenced to two years in state prison for state-law burglary and identity theft. The defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint states a legally sufficient claim.

Court’s Analysis

The court applied the rule from Heck v. Humphrey: a plaintiff generally cannot obtain damages under § 1983 when success would necessarily imply that an existing criminal conviction or sentence is invalid, unless that conviction or sentence has been overturned or otherwise invalidated.

The court held that Mullin’s Fourth Amendment claim was barred because he challenged the legality of the search and seizure that formed the basis of his criminal case. A ruling that the search lacked probable cause or a warrant would necessarily imply that his arrest, conviction, and incarceration were unlawful.

The court also held that the Fourteenth Amendment due-process claim was barred. Mullin alleged that he lacked notice and an opportunity to contest the seizure of his belongings and that defendants withheld exculpatory evidence. The court concluded that a ruling that the proceedings leading to his no-contest plea violated due process would effectively declare his convictions invalid.

The court likewise dismissed the municipal-liability claim. Because that claim depended on alleged violations of the same Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, success on it would also require showing constitutional violations that implied the invalidity of Mullin’s convictions. The court noted that the alleged conduct could have been challenged through a suppression motion in the criminal case or a petition challenging his confinement, rather than through a damages claim under § 1983.

Mullin’s supplemental brief raised allegations concerning a sentencing enhancement and retaliatory parole conditions. The court stated that these allegations arose after the events underlying the complaint, were unclear, and could not cure the complaint’s deficiencies. It also concluded that the allegations implicated the validity of his continuing confinement and were barred by the same rule.

The court treated the First Amendment claim differently. It understood the claim to allege selective and malicious prosecution in retaliation for protected activity, including communicating with courts and agencies about government misconduct. The court held that this claim was not barred by Heck, but dismissed it for failure to state a claim because Mullin did not plausibly allege that the defendants knew about or were motivated by his protected activity.

Disposition

The defendants’ motion to dismiss was GRANTED. Mullin’s Fourth Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, and municipal-liability claims were DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. His First Amendment claim was DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND, limited to a First Amendment retaliation claim. He was ordered to file an amended complaint by October 15, 2025, and could not add new claims or parties without permission. The court did not decide whether the state-law claims survived the motion.