Duncan v. County of Humboldt

Background

Darcey Lee Duncan sued Humboldt County, seven County employees, and two employees of the Cher-Ae Heights Indian Community of the Trinidad Rancheria over the custodial placement of her nieces, R.K. and N.O. Duncan alleged that County and tribal personnel improperly revoked her tribally approved home status, removed N.O. from her care, investigated and reported alleged abuse of R.K., and interfered with her family relationships and complaints about compliance with the Indian Child Welfare Act.

Duncan asserted 10 causes of action: constitutional violations concerning N.O.; constitutional violations concerning R.K.; First Amendment retaliation; failure to prevent constitutional violations by subordinates; municipal-liability claims against the County; state civil-rights claims; malicious prosecution; intentional infliction of emotional distress; negligent infliction of emotional distress; and declaratory and injunctive relief.

The United States was substituted for the two tribal employees because the parties stipulated that they were acting within the scope of their federal employment with the Trinidad Rancheria. The United States moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). The County Defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).

Rulings on the United States’ Motion

The court held that Duncan had not satisfied the Federal Tort Claims Act’s administrative-exhaustion requirement before filing suit. She said she submitted an administrative claim to the Department of the Interior on November 30, 2023, but she had filed this action on April 15, 2023. Because she filed suit before submitting the administrative claim, the court concluded that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over her claims against the United States.

The United States’s motion to dismiss was GRANTED without prejudice but without leave to amend. The court’s conclusion used those exact terms.

Rulings on the County Defendants’ Motion

The court dismissed Duncan’s sixth through tenth causes of action in whole or in part as described in the order. Duncan did not oppose dismissal of the seventh, eighth, ninth, and tenth causes of action, and she conceded dismissal of the Unruh Act claim within the sixth cause of action. The court also dismissed the remaining Bane Act claim in the sixth cause of action because Duncan improperly grouped allegations against multiple defendants rather than stating the basis of the claim against each defendant. These claims were DISMISSED with leave to amend.

For the first cause of action concerning N.O., the court dismissed all three counts without leave to amend. It rejected the claim concerning tribally approved home status because the complaint attributed the revocation to the Tribe, not the County Defendants, and did not allege that the County Defendants acted under state law or had authority over the status. The court also held that qualified immunity applied because Duncan identified no clearly established constitutional property interest in being a tribally approved home.

The court also dismissed Duncan’s familial-association claim concerning N.O. under qualified immunity. Even assuming Duncan had plausibly alleged that she was an Indian custodian and had a protected relationship with N.O., the court held that no clearly established law put beyond debate that her particular relationship with N.O. was constitutionally protected. The judicial-deception claim concerning N.O. was likewise barred by qualified immunity because it depended on that same not-clearly-established familial-association interest. The first cause of action was GRANTED without leave to amend as to the County Defendants.

The court dismissed the second cause of action concerning alleged judicial deception and fabricated evidence related to R.K. without leave to amend. Duncan did not identify clearly established law recognizing a legal guardian’s constitutional liberty interest in continued custody of a child, so qualified immunity barred the claim. The second cause of action was GRANTED without leave to amend.

The court granted the motion to dismiss Duncan’s third cause of action for First Amendment retaliation with leave to amend because the complaint did not clearly identify which protected speech formed the basis of the retaliation claim. The court separately held that the claim against County Counsel Baca was inadequately pleaded and that absolute prosecutorial immunity protected her from damages claims under Section 1983 for initiating proceedings and performing functions closely connected to the juvenile-court process. That claim against Baca was also DISMISSED with leave to amend.

The fourth cause of action alleged that County employees Winstead and Beck failed to maintain or create policies and training that would prevent unconstitutional conduct by social workers. Because the claims were brought against them only in their official capacities and duplicated the claims against the County, the fourth cause of action was GRANTED without leave to amend.

For the fifth cause of action, the court dismissed the claims against Winstead and Beck in their official capacities without leave to amend because the claim was effectively against the County. The court dismissed the municipal-liability claim against the County with leave to amend. The court held that Duncan had not plausibly alleged a County policy, custom, or practice that caused a constitutional violation. In particular, she relied mainly on N.O.’s removal and did not provide enough facts showing a broader pattern, policy, or failure to train that caused the alleged constitutional injury.

Disposition

The court’s conclusion stated:

- The United States’s motion to dismiss was GRANTED without prejudice but without leave to amend. - The County Defendants’ motion to dismiss Duncan’s first, second, and fourth causes of action in their entirety was GRANTED without leave to amend. - Duncan’s fifth cause of action against Winstead and Beck was DISMISSED without leave to amend. - Duncan’s fifth cause of action against the County was DISMISSED with leave to amend. - Duncan’s third, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, and tenth causes of action were DISMISSED with leave to amend.

The order required any amended complaint to be filed by March 29, 2024.