Psalms v. City and County of San Francisco

Background

Jon-Marques Psalms joined the San Francisco Police Department (SFPD) academy in May 2025. He had no known medical conditions and was described as being in excellent physical health. The defendants did not conduct any pre-participation medical screening for unknown conditions.

On August 20, 2025, Psalms took part in a 'Red Man' training drill — a simulated combat exercise preceded by strenuous calisthenics designed to elevate heart rates. The plaintiffs alleged that Captain Christopher Canning, Lieutenant Raymond Cruz, and an unnamed officer designated Doe 4 forced Psalms to participate despite known dangers and a lack of safety precautions. During the drill, Doe 4 allegedly inflicted a head injury on Psalms that caused a brain bleed. After the exercise, Psalms was found face down on the ground, transported to a medical center, and died on August 22, 2025. The official cause of death combined a brain injury from the blow to his head with cardiac complications stemming from congenital heart conditions that could have been detected through pre-participation screening.

The plaintiffs — described as Psalms's beneficiaries — sued the City and County of San Francisco (CCSF), the SFPD, Canning, Cruz, and Doe defendants. All parties consented to magistrate-judge jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), which allows a magistrate judge to handle a case with the full authority of a district judge.

Claims at Issue

The complaint (the First Amended Complaint, or FAC) raised five claims: - Claim 1 (Battery): Against Doe 4 — a state-law claim. - Claim 2 (State-Created Danger): Against Canning, Cruz, and Doe 4 — a federal constitutional claim under the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause. - Claim 3 (Deprivation of Familial Relationship): Against Canning, Cruz, and Doe 4 — another Fourteenth Amendment due process theory. - Claim 4 (Negligence): Against all defendants — a state-law claim. - Claim 5 (Monell Liability): Against the CCSF — a theory under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (the federal civil rights statute) holding local governments liable when an unconstitutional policy or custom causes harm.

Legal Standard

The court applied the standard for a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6): accepting the complaint's factual allegations as true and asking whether, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, the complaint alleges enough facts to state a plausible claim for relief. Conclusory allegations — labels without supporting facts — do not count.

Analysis

Claim 2: State-Created Danger

The government generally has no constitutional duty to protect individuals from private harm. Two exceptions exist: a 'special relationship' between the plaintiff and the state, or the 'state-created danger' doctrine, which applies when the government affirmatively places someone in a dangerous situation while acting with deliberate indifference to a known or obvious danger.

To succeed on a state-created danger claim, the plaintiff must show: (1) the officers' affirmative actions created or exposed the plaintiff to a particularized danger he would not otherwise have faced; (2) the injury was foreseeable; and (3) the officers were deliberately indifferent to the known danger. 'Deliberate indifference' requires that the defendant actually recognized an unreasonable risk and intentionally exposed the plaintiff to it without regard for the consequences.

The court found the claim inadequately pleaded on two grounds. First, apart from the conclusory allegation that the defendants 'forced' Psalms to participate, the complaint described only things the defendants failed to do — no health baseline check, no vital-sign monitoring, no training of personnel. Failures to act (omissions) do not satisfy the affirmative-act requirement of the state-created danger doctrine. Second, the plaintiffs did not explain how the allegations showed that the defendants knew something harmful would happen to Psalms specifically and proceeded anyway, which is what deliberate indifference requires.

Claim 3: Deprivation of Familial Relationship

A Fourteenth Amendment claim for deprivation of familial relations requires 'conscience-shocking' official conduct. The defendants argued that the complaint did not plausibly allege such conduct. The plaintiffs' opposition did not meaningfully contest this, stating only that a familial-association claim could be predicated on a state-danger theory. The court held that the plaintiffs had conceded this claim by failing to defend it.

Qualified Immunity (Claims 2 and 3)

Qualified immunity shields government officials from civil liability when their conduct does not violate a 'clearly established' constitutional right of which a reasonable person would have known. Courts assess: (1) whether a constitutional right was violated, and (2) whether that right was clearly established at the time. Here, the parties disputed only the second prong.

The defendants argued that no consensus of case law had established that running a sanctioned academy drill without medical pre-screening or electronic vital-sign monitoring violates the Fourteenth Amendment. The plaintiffs relied on a district court decision from Arizona, Coby v. City of Tombstone, No. CV-25-00226-TUC-JGZ (D. Ariz. Nov. 24, 2025), which addressed a police officer injured by K9s with concealed histories.

The court found Coby distinguishable on the facts: in Coby, defendants took affirmative acts including altering a dog's medical records to hide a violent history, while the complaint here alleged only omissions. The cases Coby itself relied upon (Pauluk v. Savage, L.W. v. Grubbs, and Polanco v. Diaz) also all involved affirmative acts placing employees in danger, unlike the allegations here. Additionally, the court noted that even if Coby were not distinguishable, it was decided in November 2025 — three months after the Red Man drill — and therefore could not have provided the defendants fair notice that their conduct was unlawful at the time of the events.

The court concluded that qualified immunity applies to Claims 2 and 3 in addition to those claims being inadequately pleaded. Both claims were dismissed without prejudice, as additional facts might alter the analysis.

Claim 5: Monell Liability Against CCSF

A Monell claim requires an underlying constitutional violation as a predicate. Because Claims 2 and 3 failed, there was no constitutional violation to anchor Monell liability. The court also noted that even if the constitutional claims had survived, the FAC did not identify any specific policy, custom, practice, or final policymaker — a separate deficiency the plaintiffs did not address in their briefing.

Claims 1 and 4: State-Law Battery and Negligence

Federal courts may exercise 'supplemental jurisdiction' over state-law claims when they arise from the same set of facts as a valid federal claim. With all federal claims dismissed, the court determined it lacked supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 and dismissed the battery and negligence claims as well.

Disposition

The court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss all claims. The plaintiffs were given leave to amend and must file a revised complaint by September 17, 2026, along with a redline comparison showing the changes made.