Galindo v. City of San Francisco

Background

On October 10, 2020, San Francisco Police Officers Nicholas Delgado and Kyle Roach shot and killed Cesar Vargas. Dora Galindo, Juan Antonio Vargas, and Rocio Anel Vargas—identified in the opinion as Vargas’s mother, father, and sister—sued the officers and the City and County of San Francisco on their own behalf and as successors in interest to Vargas. They asserted constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1988, along with state-law claims for negligence, assault, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and violation of California’s Bane Act, California Civil Code § 52.1.

The officers responded to a report of an attempted carjacking involving a knife. The opinion states that Vargas ran from the officers, continued to possess a knife after commands to drop it, and then ran toward Officer Delgado while holding the knife. The officers fired five shots in total, and Vargas died at the scene.

Pretrial Motions and Standing

The court denied the defendants’ motion to strike the plaintiffs’ supplemental material. It granted the motion to seal the redacted portions of a computer-aided-dispatch record and ordered the defendants to file a properly redacted version within seven days. It denied as moot the request to seal a laboratory report because the defendants stated they were not filing it and no party relied on it.

For the Fourth Amendment survival claim, the court held that Dora Galindo and Juan Antonio Vargas satisfied California’s requirements to proceed as Vargas’s successors in interest. Although their required declaration was filed after the two-year limitations period, the court held that the filing related back to the original complaint and therefore was timely. Rocio Anel Vargas was not an intestate successor because Vargas’s parents survived him and she had not filed the required declaration. The court dismissed her as a plaintiff on the Fourth Amendment claim.

For the Fourteenth Amendment familial-association claim, the court held that Vargas’s parents had standing but that his sister did not. The court dismissed Rocio Anel Vargas as a plaintiff on that claim.

Fourth Amendment Claim

The court applied the summary-judgment standard, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs. It evaluated whether the shooting was an unreasonable use of deadly force under the Fourth Amendment and separately considered qualified immunity. Qualified immunity can protect government officials from civil damages unless their conduct violated a constitutional right that was clearly established at the time.

The court concluded that the relevant circumstances did not allow a reasonable factfinder to determine that the officers used constitutionally excessive force. It found that the reported carjacking with a knife was a serious, violent felony; that Vargas posed an immediate threat because he ran toward Officer Delgado while holding a knife; and that Vargas was evading arrest. The court also found that the officers gave multiple warnings before shooting. Although the plaintiffs argued that the officers should have used containment or other less intrusive tactics, the court held that officers need not use the least intrusive option when responding to an urgent situation, so long as their conduct falls within the range of reasonable responses.

The court further held that, even assuming a constitutional violation, the officers were entitled to qualified immunity. The plaintiffs did not identify controlling precedent that clearly established that shooting a person in the circumstances presented—after a reported violent felony, repeated warnings, and the person’s advance toward officers while armed with a knife—was unlawful in October 2020. The court therefore granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the Fourth Amendment claim.

Fourteenth and First Amendment Claims

The court held that a claim based on the force directed at Vargas himself had to be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment, not the Fourteenth Amendment. A separate familial-association claim could potentially be brought by a parent or child, but the plaintiffs did not plead or defend such a claim. The court also found that the evidence did not show that the officers acted with a purpose to harm Vargas unrelated to legitimate law-enforcement objectives. It granted summary judgment on the plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment claim.

The plaintiffs did not plead facts supporting a First Amendment claim and did not defend that claim in their opposition. The court stated that, because the Fourteenth Amendment claim failed, the First Amendment claim also failed. The court granted summary judgment on the plaintiffs’ first cause of action, which alleged that the officers violated Vargas’s First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights.

Bane Act Claim

The Bane Act permits a civil action when a person’s constitutional or statutory rights are interfered with by threats, intimidation, or coercion. The court explained that a Bane Act claim generally requires the elements of a § 1983 claim plus a specific intent to violate a constitutional right. The plaintiffs alleged that the officers used violence against Vargas because of his national ancestry, ethnic origin, and race, but they presented no evidence that the officers were motivated by those characteristics. The court granted summary judgment on the Bane Act claim.

Remaining State Claims and Disposition

After resolving the only federal cause of action and the Bane Act claim, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims. It explained that those claims required separate analysis under state law, which may be broader than federal Fourth Amendment law, and could involve state-law immunities. The court dismissed the remaining state-law claims without prejudice.

The order therefore granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to the plaintiffs’ first cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and their fifth cause of action under California Civil Code § 52.1. All remaining claims were dismissed without prejudice. The order disposed of Docket Numbers 54, 55, and 66.