Bess v. Peffley

Background

Daniel Bess brought claims under a federal civil-rights statute against correctional officer J. Peffley. Bess alleged that Peffley violated the First Amendment by threatening to label him a snitch, falsely validate him as a gang member, and place false confidential memoranda in his file unless Bess provided information about the Mexican Mafia. Bess also alleged that Peffley falsified confidential memoranda after Bess threatened to file an administrative grievance, affecting Bess’s upcoming parole suitability hearing.

The court had previously granted in part and denied in part Peffley’s first motion for summary judgment. Because Bess did not oppose Peffley’s request to file another motion, the court allowed the second motion. After briefing and a hearing, the court ruled on the second motion.

Late-Produced Evidence

Bess objected to nine exhibits that Peffley produced in July 2025, more than 10 months after fact discovery closed. Bess argued that the documents were responsive to his requests for documents concerning the February 2021 confidential memoranda.

Peffley conceded that the documents were responsive but argued that Bess could not object because he had not filed a motion to compel additional discovery responses. The court rejected that argument. It found that Peffley’s earlier discovery responses did not disclose that responsive documents were being withheld and that testimony suggested the drafts might have been shredded. The court also found that counsel had an obligation to ensure that Peffley searched for responsive documents when the requests were made. Because the documents were disclosed more than 10 months after fact discovery closed and near summary judgment and trial, the court found the failure to disclose earlier was neither substantially justified nor harmless. The court therefore sustained Bess’s objections.

First Amendment Retaliation Claim

The court rejected Peffley’s argument that the entire retaliation claim was barred by the rule from Heck v. Humphrey. That rule prevents a state prisoner from recovering damages under the federal civil-rights statute when winning the claim would necessarily invalidate the prisoner’s conviction or sentence, unless that conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.

The court held that Bess’s claim about false memoranda placed in his file did not necessarily imply that his confinement was invalid. Under the court’s analysis, the parole board could consider many forms of information, and the presence or absence of a disciplinary infraction did not necessarily determine whether parole would be granted. A factfinder could therefore conclude that Peffley placed the memoranda in Bess’s file to discourage him from filing grievances without also finding that Bess would have received parole absent the memoranda.

The court did hold that Heck barred Bess from recovering damages based on the prior denial of parole because awarding those damages would necessarily imply that his continued confinement after that decision was unlawful. The court concluded, however, that the availability of at least nominal damages meant the Heck rule did not eliminate the First Amendment claim entirely.

The court also found genuine disputes of material fact concerning causation. Those disputes included whether Peffley threatened to place gang-related information in Bess’s file in response to Bess’s stated intention to file a grievance and whether Peffley was involved in placing the memoranda in the file. The close timing between the threats and the memoranda also supported allowing the claim to proceed. The court further found that a jury could decide whether Peffley’s conduct chilled Bess’s willingness to file a grievance.

The court denied qualified immunity on the First Amendment claim. Qualified immunity is legal protection for government officials unless their conduct violated a constitutional right that was clearly established at the time. The court concluded that existing law clearly established that an official could not take adverse action to punish a prisoner for exercising the right to pursue civil-rights litigation or file grievances.

Eighth Amendment Claim

Bess’s Eighth Amendment theory was that Peffley tried to force him into the dangerous position of being a snitch by threatening him if he refused. Bess did not agree to become a snitch and was not attacked by other inmates.

The court reconsidered whether qualified immunity applied, even though it had previously found that Peffley was not entitled to qualified immunity on this claim. The court found that Peffley had not shown the diligence or changed circumstances needed for formal reconsideration of the earlier order, but it exercised its discretion to review the issue before trial.

The court concluded that the cited precedent did not clearly establish that threatening an inmate to become a snitch violated the Eighth Amendment. In particular, the court explained that a cited Ninth Circuit decision addressed whether the prisoner had suffered an injury sufficient for federal-court jurisdiction, not whether the conduct violated the Eighth Amendment. Another decision involving the labeling of a prisoner as a snitch did not include an Eighth Amendment claim. Because Bess did not show that the constitutional right was clearly established, the court granted summary judgment to Peffley on the Eighth Amendment claim based on qualified immunity.

Disposition

The court granted in part and denied in part Peffley’s second motion for summary judgment. Summary judgment was granted on Bess’s First Amendment retaliation claim to the extent he sought damages resulting from the prior denial of parole, but was otherwise denied as to that claim. Summary judgment was also granted on the Eighth Amendment claim on qualified-immunity grounds.

The court granted Peffley’s administrative motion to seal at Docket No. 130. It denied Bess’s administrative motion to seal at Docket No. 148 because Peffley, the party that designated the material, did not submit a supporting declaration. The court set a status conference for January 14, 2026, and directed the parties to provide a joint status update by January 8, 2026. The order disposed of Docket Nos. 129, 130, and 148.