Roshan v. Lawrence

Background

Peyman Roshan brought claims challenging the California State Bar’s Rules of Procedure and internal rules and policies. He alleged violations of the Fourteenth Amendment, California Business and Professions Code section 6805, the Supremacy Clause, and the First Amendment. He sought injunctive and declaratory relief against George Cardona, the State Bar of California’s current Chief Trial Counsel, and Melanie J. Lawrence, his predecessor.

The court had previously dismissed claims because Roshan had not alleged facts supporting a sufficient likelihood of future injury. The court allowed another amendment solely to give him an opportunity to allege facts showing that he was likely to face future disciplinary proceedings under the challenged rules and policies.

In his fourth amended complaint, Roshan alleged that the California Department of Real Estate had held a hearing and revoked his real estate license. He alleged that a State Bar attorney told him that he needed to report that discipline through specified State Bar procedures and that failing to do so risked further discipline. Roshan alleged that he did not make that report and therefore faced future disciplinary action.

Court’s analysis

The defendants moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), which allows dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The court treated the standing challenge as a facial challenge, meaning it assessed whether the complaint’s allegations were sufficient to establish federal jurisdiction and assumed the well-pleaded allegations were true.

The court explained that standing requires an injury that is concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; a connection between the injury and the challenged conduct; and a likelihood that a favorable decision would remedy the injury. A person seeking prospective relief, such as an injunction or declaratory judgment, must show continuing harmful effects or a sufficient likelihood of being harmed again in a similar way.

The court concluded that Roshan’s new allegations did not plausibly show a likely future disciplinary proceeding. He did not allege that the State Bar’s Office of Chief Trial Counsel had threatened to begin proceedings, that he had received the written notice required before disciplinary charges could be filed, or that further discipline was imminent or likely. The court also noted that Roshan was currently suspended for failing to pay licensing fees and that he had not plausibly alleged that the State Bar would devote resources to disciplining him for failing to report discipline that resulted from the State Bar’s own order.

The court declined to reconsider allegations concerning continuing effects from Roshan’s earlier discipline because its prior order had explained that the requested relief would conflict with the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The court also declined to address claims that Roshan had realleged or expanded even though the prior order had dismissed them without leave to amend, because the amendment had been allowed only for allegations concerning likely future disciplinary proceedings.

Disposition

The court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the fourth amended complaint and dismissed it for lack of standing. Because Roshan had previously been given more than one opportunity to amend, the court stated that the dismissal was with prejudice. It directed the Clerk to enter judgment and close the case.