Mendones v. Glen Oaks LLC

Background

Pro se plaintiff Maridol Mendones filed her complaint on May 28, 2026, naming as defendants her landlord, Glen Oaks LLC, and the former property manager and assistant property manager for Glen Oaks Apartment. She brings claims under the Fair Housing Act (FHA) and several state laws. Her core allegation is that a neighbor, Douglas Richardson, yells, bangs on walls, walks, cooks in the kitchen, uses the faucet, and calls security guards late at night. She alleges defendants failed to take action against Richardson because he is white and she is Asian-American. She and her husband are described in the complaint as the only Asian occupants of the four-unit building.

This case has a prior history. Mendones and her husband previously filed a state court action against similar defendants raising similar claims. That action was dismissed as a terminating sanction — meaning the case was ended as a punishment — because a court found Mendones had fabricated evidence. (Case No. 23CV028772, California Superior Court.)

Procedural History

On July 2, 2026, Magistrate Judge Sallie Kim issued a report and recommendation (R&R) recommending dismissal of the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) — the statute allowing courts to screen and dismiss cases filed by people who cannot afford filing fees — on the ground that the claims are barred by res judicata, the doctrine that prevents relitigation of claims already decided in a prior case. After the deadline for objections passed with none filed, the district court adopted the R&R in full.

Mendones then filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59(e) and 60(b), arguing she never received notice of the R&R and therefore had no opportunity to object. Rule 59(e) allows a party to move to alter or amend a judgment. Rule 60(b) allows relief from a final judgment for reasons including mistake, excusable neglect, newly discovered evidence, fraud, or any other reason that justifies relief. The court accepted Mendones's argument that lost mail may constitute excusable neglect and granted the motion, setting aside the prior judgment.

Independent Basis for Dismissal: Failure to State an FHA Claim

Rather than proceeding to consider Mendones's substantive objections to the res judicata finding, Judge Tigar dismissed the complaint on an independent ground: failure to state a federal claim.

The Legal Standard for FHA Hostile Housing Environment Claims

Mendones's sole federal claim arises under 42 U.S.C. § 3617, which makes it unlawful to "coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any person in the exercise or enjoyment of" rights protected by the FHA's anti-discrimination provisions. The court noted that the Ninth Circuit (the federal appeals court with jurisdiction over this district) has not yet explicitly outlined the scope of landlord liability under an FHA hostile living environment claim for failing to address tenant-on-tenant harassment. Other circuits — including the Second and Seventh Circuits — have recognized such a claim.

The court applied the elements that district courts in this region have used: a plaintiff must show (1) the harassment was based on the plaintiff's membership in a protected class; (2) the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to deprive her of her right to enjoy her home; and (3) the landlord or management knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take prompt remedial action.

Why the Complaint Falls Short

The court focused on the first element — whether Richardson's conduct was based on Mendones's race or other protected characteristic. The complaint's allegations — yelling, cooking, using plumbing, walking — describe conduct that appears unrelated to Mendones specifically and would likely affect other tenants equally. The allegation that Richardson calls security guards with false noise complaints on nights Mendones is not home also failed to raise a plausible inference of discriminatory motive; the court observed it is unclear why anyone would complain about noise when Mendones was not home.

Mendones alleged that she and her husband are the only Asian occupants in the building and that defendants refused to evict Richardson because he and the defendants share the same race (both white). The court held, citing the Supreme Court's decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), that the racial identities of the parties alone do not raise a plausible inference that Richardson's conduct constituted discriminatory harassment. A complaint must allege sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to make a claim plausible on its face — not merely possible.

Disposition

The court: - Granted Mendones's motion to alter or amend the judgment (ECF No. 12), setting aside the prior dismissal. - Dismissed the federal FHA claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. - Declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims in the absence of a surviving federal claim, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). - Gave Mendones 28 days from the date of this order to file an amended complaint addressing only the deficiencies identified — specifically, the failure to allege facts connecting Richardson's conduct to racial discrimination. Failure to file an amended complaint within that period will result in dismissal of the case with prejudice (meaning it cannot be refiled).