Lyman v. Quinstreet, Inc.
- Fitts
- 5:23-cv-05056
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 8
In Lyman v. Quinstreet, Inc., Judge Fitts denied QuinStreet’s motion to dismiss, allowing a Telephone Consumer Protection Act claim about calls to a registered cell number to proceed.
Maxx Lyman and the proposed class of people described in his complaint may continue pursuing the alleged Telephone Consumer Protection Act claim; QuinStreet’s motion to dismiss was denied.
What happened
In Lyman v. Quinstreet, Inc., Maxx Lyman alleged that QuinStreet made telemarketing calls and sent text messages to his number even though it was registered on the National Do Not Call Registry. He brought the case as a proposed class action under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.
QuinStreet argued that Lyman could not sue under the law because his number was connected to a cell phone and therefore was not a residential telephone. The court rejected that argument, explaining that a cell phone registered on the Do Not Call Registry can be treated as a residential phone.
The court denied QuinStreet’s motion to dismiss, allowing Lyman’s claim to continue, and struck both parties’ unapproved supplemental submissions. Judge P. Casey Fitts issued the order.
The detailed version
- Lyman v. Quinstreet, Inc. · No. 5:23-cv-05056
- Fitts
- July 12, 2024
Background
Maxx Lyman filed a proposed class action against QuinStreet, Inc., seeking damages and an injunction. He alleged that QuinStreet made telemarketing calls and sent text messages to solicit insurance business, including calls to telephone numbers on the National Do Not Call Registry. Lyman alleged that his number, 617-512-XXXX, was used for residential and personal purposes, was not associated with a business, and had been registered on the registry since 2005. He alleged that QuinStreet contacted him about its insurance services on at least August 31, 2023.
Lyman alleged violations of Section 227(c) of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. He sought $500 for each negligent violation and $1,500 for each knowing or willful violation, as well as an injunction barring QuinStreet from calling numbers on the registry.
Motion to Dismiss Standard
QuinStreet moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), which permits dismissal for failure to state a legally sufficient claim. At this stage, the court accepts the complaint’s factual allegations as true and views them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, while requiring facts that support a reasonable inference that the defendant may be liable.
Supplemental Submissions
The court struck QuinStreet’s statement of a recent decision and Lyman’s statement of a recent decision because both were filed without court approval after the noticed hearing date. The court nevertheless took judicial notice of the two cited decisions.
Analysis
The court stated that a Section 227(c) claim requires allegations that the plaintiff is a residential telephone subscriber, registered the number on the Do Not Call Registry, and nevertheless received an unsolicited call initiated by a person or entity. The court concluded that Lyman had alleged each of these elements.
QuinStreet argued that a cell phone could not be a residential telephone under Section 227(c). The court rejected that argument. It relied on binding Ninth Circuit precedent holding that cellular phones used for personal and business purposes can be presumptively residential for purposes of Section 227(c). The court also relied on Federal Communications Commission regulations and the agency’s 2003 order, which create a presumption that a wireless subscriber who registers a number on the national Do Not Call Registry is a residential subscriber.
The court explained that “cellular” and “residential” describe different characteristics: cellular concerns the technology used to provide telephone service, while residential concerns the type of subscriber. The court found that the statutory categories can overlap. It also reasoned that the privacy interests protected by Section 227(c) do not depend on whether an unwanted solicitation reaches a cell phone or a landline.
The court gave respectful consideration to the Federal Communications Commission’s interpretation because Congress expressly authorized the agency to develop rules implementing Section 227(c). The court stated that it would reach the same conclusion even without relying on that interpretation.
Disposition
The court denied QuinStreet’s motion to dismiss. The order therefore left Lyman’s adequately pleaded Section 227(c) claim pending; it did not decide whether QuinStreet will ultimately be liable for the alleged calls or messages.
Read the full 8-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.