Tan v. California Highway Patrol

Background

Jieyuan Tan sued the California Highway Patrol (CHP) and officers Arturo Ramirez, Adam Rikalo, David Cornelis, and Kenny under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The complaint arose from a January 11, 2026 vehicle collision in Santa Cruz County, California, and the officers’ investigation and collision reports.

Tan alleged that the reports falsely stated that no telephone communication occurred between Tan and an officer, omitted or failed to preserve evidence, omitted photographs of the front bumper of Rikalo’s vehicle, left out information about a patrol vehicle and roadway conditions, and contained inconsistencies with physical evidence. Tan also alleged that Kenny acted aggressively when Tan appeared at a CHP office to challenge the report. The complaint further alleged that officers treated Tan differently because he is Chinese and that the alleged constitutional violations resulted from agency policies or widespread customs.

The complaint asserted three claims: a Fourteenth Amendment due-process claim for fabrication of evidence under § 1983, a Fourteenth Amendment equal-protection claim under § 1983, and a municipal-liability claim under Monell v. Department of Social Services. Defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint states a legally sufficient claim. The court also considered defendants’ request for judicial notice of part of the complaint.

Judicial Notice

The court denied defendants’ request for judicial notice. It explained that although a court may take notice of its own files, it did not need to take notice of documents filed on the docket in this case. The court also noted that the complaint exceeded 1,000 pages and that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires a short and plain statement of the claim. Exhibits may supplement allegations but cannot replace well-pleaded facts in the complaint itself.

CHP’s Sovereign Immunity

The court held that the Eleventh Amendment barred all claims against CHP. The court treated CHP as an arm of the State of California and found that California had not consented to suit. It therefore granted defendants’ motion to dismiss all claims against CHP without leave to amend because amendment would be futile.

The court rejected defendants’ argument that the individual officers were also protected by the Eleventh Amendment. The court understood the officers to be sued in their individual capacities for damages, so it continued to analyze the claims against them.

First Cause of Action: Fabrication of Evidence

The court held that Tan sufficiently alleged, at the pleading stage, that the officers deliberately included false statements and omissions in the investigative reports. A § 1983 fabrication-of-evidence claim requires deliberate fabrication by the defendant official and a resulting deprivation of liberty. The court found that Tan’s allegations about purposeful false statements and omissions were enough to allege deliberate fabrication at that stage.

The court nevertheless found that the complaint did not adequately allege the required deprivation of liberty or property. Although Tan’s opposition described interests he claimed to have lost, the complaint did not identify those interests or provide facts supporting the alleged deprivations. For example, it did not allege that his driver’s license had been revoked or restricted because of the reports, and it did not provide the facts needed for a “stigma-plus” claim, which requires reputational harm combined with an additional legally protected injury.

The court therefore granted defendants’ motion to dismiss the first cause of action against the officers with leave to amend because amendment would not be futile.

Second Cause of Action: Equal Protection

Tan alleged that the officers violated equal protection by treating him differently because he is Chinese, including by ignoring his statements, preventing him from documenting the scene, and crediting the non-Chinese driver’s account without a meaningful investigation.

The court held that the complaint did not adequately allege that Tan was treated differently from a similarly situated person. The complaint did not allege that the opposing driver was similarly situated in all material respects, and its general statements about how non-Chinese people would have been treated were speculative.

The court therefore granted defendants’ motion to dismiss the second cause of action against the officers with leave to amend because amendment would not be futile.

Third Cause of Action: Municipal Liability

Tan’s third cause of action alleged that constitutional violations resulted from de facto policies or widespread customs. The court explained that a Monell claim may impose liability on a municipal entity for an injury caused by a government policy or custom, or by a failure to train employees amounting to deliberate indifference to constitutional rights.

The court agreed with defendants that individually named officers are not proper defendants for a Monell claim. It therefore granted defendants’ motion to dismiss the third cause of action against the officers without leave to amend because amendment would be futile.

Disposition

Judge Nathanael Cousins granted defendants’ motion to dismiss without leave to amend as to all claims against CHP; granted the motion to dismiss with leave to amend as to the first and second causes of action against the officers; and granted the motion to dismiss without leave to amend as to the third cause of action against the officers. The entire complaint was dismissed. Tan was required either to file a first amended complaint or notify the court that he did not wish to amend by October 12, 2026, and he could not add new parties or claims without further court permission.

Because all claims were dismissed, the court did not decide defendants’ remaining arguments concerning qualified immunity or respondeat superior, a theory that an employer may be responsible for an employee’s conduct.