C.C. v. Kijakazi
- A Cisneros
- 3:23-cv-00408
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 3
In C.C. v. Kijakazi, Judge A J. Cisneros ordered the parties to clarify whether they agreed on attorneys’ fees before reviewing C.C.’s motion.
C.C. and Martin O’Malley, as the defendant identified in the opinion’s caption; the order required both parties to clarify whether they had agreed on an Equal Access to Justice Act fee award.
What happened
In C.C. v. Kijakazi, C.C. asked for attorneys’ fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act. The motion said Martin O’Malley, the defendant identified in the opinion’s caption, did not oppose the request, but he did not file the required response or statement of nonopposition.
The court explained that it generally must independently review an unopposed fee request. It also said that this review normally does not apply when the parties affirmatively agree to a particular fee award as a settlement. The court had not determined whether the parties had reached such an agreement.
Judge A J. Cisneros ordered the parties to file, by July 25, 2024, either a stipulation settling C.C.’s fee claim or a statement that they had not reached an agreement. If there was no agreement, the court said it would evaluate C.C.’s unopposed motion. The order did not grant or deny the fee request.
The detailed version
- C.C. v. Kijakazi · No. 3:23-cv-00408
- A J. Cisneros
- July 18, 2024
Background
C.C. filed a motion for attorneys’ fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), a federal law that can allow a qualifying party to recover fees from the government. The opinion’s caption identifies Martin O’Malley as the defendant and describes him as the Secretary. C.C.’s motion stated that the Secretary did not oppose the request.
The Secretary did not file an opposition brief or a statement of nonopposition within the fourteen-day period required by the district’s local rules.
Court’s analysis
The court discussed the Ninth Circuit’s rule that a district court must independently review a plaintiff’s fee request even when the government does not object. The court also discussed the Attorney General’s authority to settle litigation involving the federal government.
The court distinguished between an unopposed fee motion and an affirmative agreement to a specific fee award. In the court’s view, a court ordinarily must independently examine the reasonableness of a request when the opposing party simply fails to respond. But when the parties affirmatively agree to a particular fee award as a compromise, the court concluded that the usual independent review does not normally apply. The court reasoned that allowing such agreements can avoid additional briefing and expense.
Order
Because C.C.’s motion said that the Secretary did not oppose it, the court could not tell whether the parties had merely failed to oppose the motion or had reached an agreement settling the fee claim. The court therefore directed the parties to file no later than July 25, 2024 either:
1. A stipulation for an EAJA fee award reflecting a settlement of C.C.’s claim for fees; or 2. A statement that the parties had not reached such an agreement.
The court stated that, if the parties had not reached an agreement, it would proceed to evaluate C.C.’s unopposed motion for attorneys’ fees. The order did not decide whether C.C. was entitled to fees or award any amount.
Read the full 3-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.