M.F. v. Kijakazi

Background

This Social Security case concerns Attorney Steven Bruce’s request for attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). Bruce practiced under the name People with Disabilities Foundation and had represented M. F. in the case. M. F. first signed a 2020 agreement assigning to Bruce any fees awarded under the Equal Access to Justice Act. In 2022, she signed an agreement for Bruce to represent her through the agency Appeals Council and for fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(a)(2)(A). The 2022 agreement did not state that those fees would be paid by M. F. from an award.

M. F. won a remand in the district court, and Bruce received Equal Access to Justice Act fees. After the remand, M. F. won before the agency. At Bruce’s request, M. F. paid him $12,987 from her own money in November 2023. In January 2024, Bruce asked the district court for additional fees under Section 406(b). A previous order denied that request after reviewing the two fee agreements and finding that neither told M. F. she would need to pay Section 406(b) fees from her past-due benefits.

Bruce later withdrew from representing M. F., and the court granted the withdrawal. M. F. then proceeded without a lawyer. Bruce filed this Rule 59(e) motion to vacate the previous order denying his Section 406(b) fee request.

Analysis

Rule 59(e) allows a court to alter or amend a judgment for limited reasons, including a serious legal or factual error, newly discovered or previously unavailable evidence, a need to prevent serious injustice, or an intervening change in controlling law. The court explained that this is an extraordinary remedy that should be used sparingly and cannot be used simply to relitigate matters or present arguments that could have been made earlier.

Bruce made three arguments. First, he argued that a fee agreement or fee petition was not required when requesting Section 406(b) fees. The court disagreed. Relying on the governing precedent cited in the opinion, it stated that courts reviewing contingent-fee requests under Section 406(b) must first examine the contingent-fee agreement and then determine whether the requested fee is reasonable. Bruce had to produce a valid agreement showing that he and M. F. knowingly agreed to a fee of 25 percent of her past-due benefits under Section 406(b). The court found that he still had not done so.

Second, Bruce submitted emails that he said showed he had notified M. F. about his Section 406(b) fee request. The court found that none of the emails showed that he told M. F. about a forthcoming request for fees to be taken from her past-due benefits. According to the court, the emails indicated that the earliest correspondence about the Section 406(b) request occurred at the end of February 2024, nearly a month after Bruce filed the motion.

Third, Bruce attributed fault or confusion to three delayed notices from the Social Security Administration about M. F.’s past-due benefits. The court found that the notices did not resolve the central problem: Bruce never had a proper agreement informing M. F. that she would be asked to give up part of her award for attorney’s fees, in addition to the Equal Access to Justice Act fees and the $12,987 payment.

Disposition

The court held that Bruce’s arguments failed under Rule 59(e). Attorney Bruce’s motion to alter or amend the judgment was DENIED. His separate request to reargue the Section 406(b) fee motion was also DENIED. The opinion does not state that either denial was with or without prejudice.