Garrick v. Garrick

Background

Owen Garrick filed a second amended complaint against Jocelyn Freeman Garrick, the County of Alameda, Deputies Karl and John Doe of the Alameda County Sheriff’s Department, and Mentoring in Medicine & Science, Inc. The opinion states that Garrick and Freeman Garrick are physicians in Alameda County and had founded Mentoring in Medicine & Science together. Garrick alleged that, after Freeman Garrick filed for dissolution of their 22-year marriage, she used her county positions and contacts to harass him and gain an advantage in the divorce proceedings.

Garrick identified four main incidents: the closure of a complaint against Freeman Garrick for allegedly violating COVID-19 shelter-in-place orders; the service of a denied restraining order by two armed sheriff’s deputies; statements by Freeman Garrick that allegedly harmed his reputation and position with Mentoring in Medicine & Science; and Freeman Garrick’s report of Garrick’s family therapist to the California Board of Psychology. Garrick asserted claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, California’s Bane Act, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and California’s Unfair Competition Law.

The court had previously dismissed claims and allowed Garrick to amend. After he filed the second amended complaint, defendants moved to dismiss and filed anti-SLAPP motions to strike.

Federal Claims Against Mentoring in Medicine & Science and Alameda County

The court dismissed Mentoring in Medicine & Science from the federal claims because the complaint did not allege specific conduct by that organization relating to those claims.

Garrick brought a civil-rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Alameda County. Such a claim against a municipality requires allegations that a constitutional violation resulted from an officially adopted policy, a longstanding custom, or a decision by a final policymaker. The court found that Garrick had not alleged facts supporting any of those grounds and dismissed the federal claims against the County.

Section 1983 Claims Against Freeman Garrick

The court explained that a claim under Section 1983 requires both a violation of a federal constitutional or statutory right and action under state authority. The court accepted Garrick’s allegations as true for purposes of the motions but concluded that most of Freeman Garrick’s alleged conduct was not shown to have been performed as part of her official duties.

Regarding the complaint about Freeman Garrick’s alleged shelter-in-place violation, the court found that the sheriff’s email indicated the complaint had already been closed before Freeman Garrick responded. Her alleged report that Garrick had made the complaint did not make her a state actor. The court also found that Garrick had not alleged non-conclusory facts showing that Freeman Garrick used her official status to influence the Mentoring in Medicine & Science board or the county conference call. It found no alleged connection between her report of the family therapist and her public duties.

The court treated the service of the denied restraining order differently. Taking the allegations in the light most favorable to Garrick, it found that the use of the sheriff’s department without service fees might support an allegation of substantial cooperation between Freeman Garrick and the state. Even so, the court found no constitutional violation. Garrick had not alleged a deprivation of life, liberty, or property for substantive or procedural due process purposes, and he had not alleged discrimination based on membership in a protected class for an equal-protection claim.

Section 1983 Claims Against Deputies Karl and John Doe

The court accepted that the deputies acted under state authority when they served the denied restraining order. It nevertheless dismissed Garrick’s constitutional claims against them.

For the Fourth Amendment excessive-force claim, the court held that the complaint alleged only verbal threats and did not allege that the officers used physical force. The verbal threats therefore did not plausibly establish excessive force. For procedural due process, Garrick did not allege deprivation of a protected liberty or property interest, and an alleged violation of sheriff’s-department policy alone was not a constitutional violation. The court also construed Garrick’s allegations about threats of physical harm as a substantive due process claim because he was proceeding without a lawyer. It found that verbal threats alone did not establish the required constitutional deprivation, although the court stated that it strongly disapproved of the alleged conduct.

Section 1985 Claims

The court dismissed Garrick’s claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2) and § 1985(3). It explained that these conspiracy claims required, among other things, a plausible underlying constitutional violation and particularized allegations showing which defendants agreed, how they conspired, and how the conspiracy caused a constitutional deprivation.

The alleged closure of the complaint did not support a conspiracy because the complaint had already been closed before Freeman Garrick responded, and Garrick did not explain how the sheriff’s personnel conspired with her. He also did not allege the required intent to deny equal protection or racial or class-based discriminatory animus. The alleged service of the denied restraining order presented a closer question because Garrick attributed race-based threats to the deputies, but the court found that he had not alleged that Freeman Garrick shared a racial motive or that the defendants formed a particularized conspiracy that caused a constitutional deprivation.

State Claims and Anti-SLAPP Motions

After dismissing all federal claims, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Garrick’s state-law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). It dismissed the Bane Act, intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress, and Unfair Competition Law claims without prejudice, stating that Garrick could refile them in state court.

The court denied the motion to strike as moot because it was dismissing the claims. In its conclusion, the court denied defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion without prejudice. The court granted defendants’ motions to dismiss the federal claims, dismissed those claims with prejudice because Garrick had already had an opportunity to amend and had not cured the deficiencies, and directed the clerk to enter judgment and close the case.