M.F. v. Kijakazi

Background

An administrative law judge denied M. F.’s application for disability benefits. M. F. appealed to the federal district court. In a November 2021 order, the court found that the administrative law judge had improperly discounted M. F.’s symptom testimony, granted M. F.’s motion for summary judgment, and remanded the matter to the Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administration.

M. F. then requested $28,780.09 in attorney’s fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, a federal law that can require the government to pay certain litigation expenses. The court granted the fee motion but reduced the award to $17,466.72. M. F. moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) to alter that judgment. The court resolved the motion on the papers and vacated the hearing.

Analysis

Rule 59(e) permits a court to change a judgment to correct a significant legal or factual error, consider newly discovered or previously unavailable evidence, prevent a serious injustice, or account for an intervening change in controlling law. The court described this as an extraordinary remedy that should be used sparingly and said it cannot be used simply to reargue matters that could have been raised earlier.

First, the court rejected M. F.’s argument that the fee award improperly compensated only one of several legal theories. The court explained that its earlier order had not found that only one government position lacked substantial justification. Instead, the earlier order reduced the requested fees based on the reasonableness of the fees, including the fact that several issues raised in M. F.’s summary-judgment motion had not been adjudicated. The court relied on Ninth Circuit authority stating that the Equal Access to Justice Act does not extend fee shifting to issues that were not adjudicated.

Second, the court upheld its earlier finding that some attorney time entries were inaccurate, duplicative, or inflated. M. F.’s counsel explained that he had reread work after removing another attorney from the case because that attorney had lied about her experience. The court concluded that this explanation supported, rather than undermined, the reduction because it meant that fees had been requested for work by counsel whom M. F.’s counsel described as incompetent or untrustworthy.

Third, the court rejected M. F.’s renewed argument that the government had acted in bad faith. M. F. offered no additional evidence or legal authority supporting bad faith and instead reargued problems with the original disability determination. The court said those matters did not show vexatious, wanton, oppressive, or otherwise bad-faith conduct. It also concluded that an alleged error concerning consultative examinations and the statement “this is a denial case” did not establish bad faith.

Finally, the court declined to consider arguments raised for the first time in M. F.’s reply brief, including an assertion that the Social Security Administration had engaged in a “40-year fraud” and a new reference to Rule 60(b)(3). The court said those arguments were outside the scope of the opening motion and had not been properly raised.

Disposition

Judge William Alsup held that none of M. F.’s arguments satisfied Rule 59(e). The court denied the motion to alter the judgment, leaving the challenged fee determination unchanged.