Roberson v. Alameda County

Background

Jahbree Roberson alleged that he was held as a pretrial detainee at Santa Rita Jail and had type 1 diabetes requiring daily blood-sugar checks and insulin injections. In September 2022, deputies allegedly pressed him against a wall and scraped his right toe. Roberson said he reported the injury but was told to make medical requests using a jail-issued tablet, which he never received.

Roberson alleged that medical staff later treated his toe, instructed that the bandages be changed daily, and recorded the treatment instructions. He further alleged that the bandages were changed only two or three times a week during his two- to three-month incarceration. After his release, he went to an emergency room, where his toe was amputated because of infection. He later alleged that an infection spread to a second toe, which was also amputated.

Claims and Motion to Dismiss

Roberson asserted two causes of action: a Fourteenth Amendment deliberate-indifference claim under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and a claim under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act. He asserted the constitutional claim against Alameda County and individual Doe defendants, and the ADA claim against Alameda County. The complaint also sought monetary damages, punitive damages, attorney fees, and injunctive relief.

The County moved to dismiss under the pleading standard requiring a complaint to contain enough factual matter to state a legally plausible claim. The County argued that the deliberate-indifference claim failed under the Eighth Amendment standard applicable to convicted prisoners. The court explained that Roberson was a pretrial detainee, so his medical-care claim arose under the Fourteenth Amendment and used an objective standard. Under that standard, the plaintiff must allege, among other things, that the defendant failed to take reasonable available measures to address a substantial risk of serious harm and that this failure caused the injury.

Section 1983 Claim Against the Doe Defendants

The court denied the County’s motion to dismiss the first cause of action as to the individual Doe defendants. It held that the County’s motion did not apply the correct Fourteenth Amendment standard and did not adequately argue that the complaint failed to plead the required elements under that standard.

The court also found that Roberson adequately pleaded causation. The complaint alleged that medical staff knew about the toe injury, knew the doctor had ordered daily bandage changes, failed to follow that instruction despite Roberson’s repeated requests, and thereby caused the injury to worsen during his incarceration. The court stated that the complaint sufficiently pleaded a Fourteenth Amendment deliberate-indifference claim.

Section 1983 Claim Against Alameda County

A claim against a government entity under Section 1983 requires allegations that a county policy, custom, or practice caused the plaintiff’s injury. The court found that the complaint vaguely suggested possible policies, customs, or training failures involving medical requests, jail-issued tablets, and supervision or training of medical staff. However, the complaint did not directly or explicitly plead such a policy, custom, or practice or expressly assert municipal liability under the rule commonly associated with Monell.

The court therefore granted the County’s motion to dismiss the first cause of action as to Alameda County without prejudice. The court granted Roberson leave to file an amended complaint addressing the municipal-liability allegations by September 6, 2024.

ADA Claim

The court held that the complaint did not adequately plead a Title II ADA claim. Roberson proceeded on a theory that the County denied reasonable modifications or accommodations related to his type 1 diabetes. The court found that the complaint did not identify a specific service, program, or activity from which Roberson was denied access or excluded. The allegations showed that he received some medical treatment, even if the treatment was allegedly inadequate.

The court also found that the complaint did not identify what heightened accommodations were required and denied because of Roberson’s diabetes. To the extent the alleged failure to change bandages daily amounted only to inadequate medical care, the court stated that inadequate treatment alone was not actionable under the ADA. The court granted without prejudice the County’s motion to dismiss the second cause of action as to all defendants and granted leave to amend by September 6, 2024.

Compensatory Damages Under the ADA

The County separately moved to dismiss Roberson’s request for compensatory damages under Title II of the ADA, arguing that such damages require discriminatory intent. Because the court was dismissing the ADA cause of action with leave to amend, and because Roberson did not directly address the compensatory-damages issue, the court granted without prejudice the motion to dismiss the request for compensatory damages. Roberson was granted leave to amend that request by September 6, 2024.

Request for Judicial Notice and Disposition

The court granted the County’s request for judicial notice of Roberson’s complaint. The court noted that judicial notice was unnecessary because the complaint was already part of the court’s docket, but granted the unopposed request.

In conclusion, the County’s motion to dismiss was denied in part and granted in part without prejudice. Roberson was granted leave to file an amended complaint consistent with the order by September 6, 2024.