Teryaeva-Reed v. Peters

Background

Julia Teryaeva-Reed, identified as a federal prisoner in Miami, Florida, filed this civil-rights case without a lawyer against officials of the Federal Bureau of Prisons. The court had dismissed her complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. She then moved for reconsideration.

Reconsideration standard

The court treated the motion as one under Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because Reed appeared to ask the court to change its decision dismissing the case or to permit amendment. The court explained that reconsideration under Rule 59(e) generally requires newly discovered evidence, clear error, or an intervening change in the law. It also stated that a question being debatable does not by itself establish clear error.

Court’s analysis

The court found that Reed had identified no new evidence or intervening change in the law and had not shown clear error. Reed argued that her claims could proceed under Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents because a court order from a recent class action involving former inmates of the Federal Correctional Institution in Dublin, California, provided statutory authority. The court rejected that argument, explaining that a court order is not a statute and that alleged violations of the class-action order must be raised in that case, through class counsel if necessary.

Reed also argued that she experienced sexual discrimination at FCI Miami because male inmates received better conditions than female inmates, violating due-process and equal-protection rights. The court stated that the initial complaint had not clearly presented such a claim. It further held that claims arising from conditions at FCI Miami belonged in the Southern District of Florida because the events occurred there and the responsible officials were located there.

The court separately considered Reed’s retaliation argument. It recognized that prison officials may not retaliate against a prisoner for exercising the First Amendment right to access the courts, but said it knew of no authority establishing that merely being a member of an ongoing class action, without filing or litigating a case, is protected conduct. Even assuming it was protected, the court found that Reed had not alleged facts plausibly showing that officials closed FCI Dublin and transferred her because of her participation in the lawsuit, or that the transfer did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal. The court therefore found no basis to reconsider its conclusion that the retaliation claim was not legally cognizable or that amendment would cure it.

Ruling

The order states: “Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration is DENIED IN PART and GRANTED IN PART.” It also states that the dismissal order was “AMENDED IN PART” so that the sexual-discrimination claims at FCI Miami were dismissed without prejudice to bringing them in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.

The final paragraph instead says that Reed’s sexual-discrimination claims at FCI Dublin were dismissed without prejudice “as described above.” Because the opinion refers to FCI Miami in its venue discussion but FCI Dublin in its final disposition, the location of the claims covered by that amendment is internally inconsistent.