AbCellera Biologics Inc. v. Berkeley Lights, Inc.

Background

The parties proposed competing constructions—the legal meanings and boundaries of patent-claim language—for ten terms from seven asserted patents in two patent families. The case is a consolidated action incorporating three patent-infringement cases originally brought in the District of Delaware and later transferred to the Northern District of California. AbCellera and UBC patented microfluidic devices and methods involving cell culturing, single-cell secretion assays, antibody discovery, and cellular-binding interactions.

The court had federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. It explained that claim construction is a legal question for the court and that claim terms generally receive their ordinary meaning as understood in the context of the patent’s claims, specification, and prosecution history.

Court’s constructions

Terms from the ’408, ’936, and ’270 patents

* “Chamber.” The court adopted: “an enclosed space within a microfluidic device, having at least one inlet for permitting fluid to enter the chamber, at least one outlet to permit fluid to exit the chamber, and at least one cell retaining position.” The court included the inlet, outlet, and cell-retaining-position requirements because the patent’s express definition stated that each chamber would have those features. It excluded language stating that cells “may” be isolated from a larger population as they flow through the device and that the retaining position “may” comprise a cell retainer, finding that language optional rather than essential.

* “Inlet.” The court adopted: “An aperture that permits fluid to enter a chamber. An inlet of a chamber cannot simultaneously be an outlet of the same chamber.” The court held that the ’408 patent family requires separate inlet and outlet openings, even though fluid flow may be reversed.

* “Outlet.” For the ’408 patent, the court adopted: “An aperture that permits fluid to exit a chamber. An outlet of a chamber cannot simultaneously be an inlet of the same chamber.”

* The phrase concerning individual cells retained in unique microfluidic chambers and transported through an introduction port and flow channel. The court adopted the plain and ordinary meaning and required no construction. It rejected Bruker’s proposal to limit the phrase to stochastic, meaning random-probability, loading of cells. The court found that proposal would add a limitation based on enablement or written-description concerns and noted that the specification disclosed both stochastic and deterministic loading.

* “Cell trap.” The court held that this term is governed by pre-America Invents Act 35 U.S.C. § 112(6), which applies when a patent claim describes a function without sufficiently identifying structure. The court adopted: “a means for receiving and retaining cells at a predetermined location over time.” The corresponding structure identified in the patent is found at pages 14:48–15:57, 34:15–35:22, and 35:53–36:26, and in Figures 3 and 4. The court included those disclosures but rejected additional passages that did not link structure to retaining cells at a predetermined location.

Terms from the ’962, ’933, ’376, and ’378 patents

* “Chamber.” The court adopted: “an enclosed space within a microfluidic device.” It rejected the proposed addition “in which a cell may be retained” as optional or exemplary language.

* “An aperture.” The court adopted the plain and ordinary meaning, excluding the surface opening of a microwell. It rejected Bruker’s proposed requirements that an aperture be an inlet or outlet capable of switching between open and closed positions and that “an” aperture mean one or more apertures. The court found that the patent expressly excluded a microwell’s surface opening but did not define every aperture as an adjustable valve or opening.

* The phrase concerning exposing a secreted antibody to a removable capture substrate. The court adopted the plain and ordinary meaning and required no construction. It rejected Bruker’s proposed requirement that the exposure occur in the chamber where the cell is retained, finding that this would improperly add a limitation from the specification.

* The phrase concerning exposing a secreted monoclonal antibody to a first removable capture substrate in fluid communication with the antibody. The court rejected Bruker’s proposed requirement that the exposure occur in the chamber where the cell is retained. It also corrected the phrase “wherein first the removable capture substrate” to “wherein the first removable capture substrate,” finding the correction to be an obvious typographical correction that was not reasonably debatable and was not contradicted by the specification or prosecution history.

* The phrase concerning exposing a first fluid volume containing antigen in fluid communication with bound antibody. The court adopted the plain and ordinary meaning and required no construction. It rejected Bruker’s argument that the phrase was indefinite. The court concluded that a person skilled in the field could understand the phrase’s scope with reasonable certainty when reading it with the claims and specification.

Disposition and effect

The court entered the claim constructions listed in its conclusion. The order resolves the parties’ disputes over the meanings and scope of the ten identified terms for the patent claims listed in the order. It does not state a final ruling on whether Bruker infringed the patents or whether the patents are valid beyond rejecting the indefiniteness argument concerning the disputed fluid-volume phrase. Judge Jon S. Tigar signed the order as a United States District Judge.