K. v. Sonoma County

Background

Plaintiffs Michelle K., P.K., and Kristin K. alleged that the County of Sonoma removed them from their biological parents’ custody in 2006 and placed Michelle K., P.K., and their sister Kaya K. with Jose and Gina Centeno. The complaint alleged that officials received repeated reports of physical and emotional abuse, including reports of bruises, fear of leaving family visits, harsh punishment, and other mistreatment. Plaintiffs alleged that county and state officials failed to conduct required checks and interviews, failed to investigate abuse reports adequately, and allowed the Centenos to adopt additional children despite concerns about the household.

The complaint further alleged that the Centenos later confined and abused the children, that Kaya had not been seen since 2012, and that Michelle K. and P.K. were found in Mexico in 2020 after years of alleged abuse. The Third Amended Complaint asserted 19 causes of action against multiple defendants, including the County, county social workers, the State of California, Amy Lafferty, and others. The County and county social workers filed one motion to dismiss, and the State and Lafferty filed another.

Legal standard

The court applied Rule 12(b)(6), which permits dismissal when a complaint does not state a claim for which relief can be granted. At this stage, the court accepted the complaint’s factual allegations as true and viewed them in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs. The court considered whether the complaint alleged enough facts, rather than deciding whether the alleged facts had ultimately been proven.

County of Sonoma and county social workers

The court denied the County defendants’ motion to dismiss the first and second federal civil-rights claims against the county social workers. Those claims alleged that the social workers failed to respond adequately to or investigate abuse reports. The court held that the allegations of repeated reports, unexplained bruises, the children’s statements, the Centenos’ admissions about restraints and punishments, and the social workers’ documented concerns sufficiently alleged deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of harm.

The court granted the motion to dismiss the third federal civil-rights claim, which alleged that defendants provided false information to a court, but granted leave to amend. The complaint did not identify the allegedly false information, the court where it was presented, or how defendants knew it was false.

The court denied the motion to dismiss the County’s Monell claim. A Monell claim seeks to hold a government entity responsible for a policy, practice, or custom that caused a constitutional violation. The court found sufficient allegations of repeated inadequate investigations and a practice of limiting investigations to the child who was the subject of a report while disregarding other children in the home. The court stated that the allegations concerning other proposed policies, including inadequate training, supervision, or discipline, lacked sufficient factual support if plaintiffs intended to pursue those theories.

For the state-law breach-of-mandatory-duty claims, the court denied the County defendants’ statutory-immunity arguments. The court concluded that the defendants had not shown at this stage that the challenged conduct involved protected discretionary policy decisions.

For count six, the court granted the motion to dismiss to the extent the claim relied on Child Welfare Services Regulation 31-405 and Welfare and Institutions Code section 16507.5, but denied the motion to dismiss to the extent the claim relied on California Adoption Regulations 35177 and 35183. The court held that the adoption regulations required face-to-face interviews, while the other cited provisions did not establish sufficiently specific mandatory duties.

For count seven, the court denied the motion to dismiss to the extent the claim relied on Welfare and Institutions Code section 328, which the court held imposed a duty to investigate child-abuse allegations. The court granted the motion to dismiss to the extent the claim relied on Penal Code section 11164, because that provision left the steps needed to protect a child to the investigators’ discretion.

The court granted the motion to dismiss count eight because Welfare and Institutions Code section 16504 allowed the agency to decide, based on a risk evaluation, whether an in-person response was appropriate. The court granted the motion to dismiss count nine because the cited provisions did not establish a mandatory duty. For count ten, the court granted the motion to dismiss as to Welfare and Institutions Code section 16501.35 but denied the motion as to Child Welfare Services Regulation 31-125, which required in-person contact with the children and at least one adult with information about the allegations.

The court granted the motion to dismiss the County defendants from counts thirteen, eighteen, and nineteen, which included intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligent infliction of emotional distress claims, with leave to amend. The court concluded that the claims appeared to be barred by California Government Code section 820.2 because they were based on social workers’ allegedly inadequate investigation of child abuse.

State of California

The court granted the State’s motion to dismiss the Third Amended Complaint with prejudice. The court held that the Eleventh Amendment barred the suit against the State and concluded that the complaint could not be saved by amendment.

Amy Lafferty

The court construed the claims against Lafferty as personal-capacity claims at this stage, so it did not dismiss them on sovereign-immunity grounds. The court denied Lafferty’s immunity arguments at the pleading stage, including her arguments for absolute and qualified immunity, because the allegations concerned investigatory conduct and alleged failures to act. The court found that the allegations sufficiently claimed that Lafferty ignored abuse reports, supported the Centenos’ adoptions despite known concerns, and deliberately disregarded a substantial risk of harm.

The court denied Lafferty’s motion to dismiss the section 1983 claim in count one. It granted the motion to dismiss the section 1983 claims in counts two and three with leave to amend. Count two alleged a state-created danger, but plaintiffs conceded Lafferty’s argument that this claim required affirmative conduct placing them in danger. Count three alleged that Lafferty provided false information to courts, but did not identify the information, court, or proceeding.

The court granted Lafferty’s motion to dismiss the section 1985 conspiracy claims in counts one through three with leave to amend because the complaint contained no factual allegations showing that Lafferty participated in a conspiracy.

For count six, the court granted in part and denied in part Lafferty’s motion to dismiss. It dismissed the claim to the extent it relied on Child Welfare Services Program 31-405.12 and Welfare and Institutions Code section 16507.5, because plaintiffs conceded those provisions did not establish a mandatory duty for Lafferty. It denied the motion to dismiss to the extent the claim relied on California Adoption Regulations 35177 and 35183, which the court held required the alleged face-to-face interviews.

The court granted Lafferty’s motion to dismiss count seven because plaintiffs did not explain what mandatory duty Welfare and Institutions Code section 328 imposed on Lafferty, and Penal Code section 11164 did not establish a mandatory duty. The court also granted the motion to dismiss count nine because the cited provisions did not establish a mandatory duty applicable to Lafferty.

The court granted Lafferty’s motion to dismiss count thirteen, an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim brought by Michelle K. and P.K., with leave to amend, based on the apparent bar created by Government Code section 820.2. It granted the motion to dismiss counts eighteen and nineteen with prejudice and granted the motion to dismiss the demand for punitive damages.

Disposition

The court granted in part and denied in part both motions to dismiss. As to the County, it denied dismissal of counts one, two, four, and ten; granted dismissal of count three with leave to amend; granted dismissal of counts eight and nine; granted dismissal of counts thirteen, eighteen, and nineteen with leave to amend; and granted in part and denied in part dismissal of counts six and seven. As to the State, it granted dismissal of the Third Amended Complaint with prejudice. As to Lafferty, it denied dismissal of the section 1983 claim in count one; granted dismissal of the section 1983 claims in counts two and three with leave to amend; granted dismissal of the section 1985 claims in counts one through three with leave to amend; granted in part and denied in part dismissal of count six; granted dismissal of counts seven and nine; granted dismissal of count thirteen with leave to amend; granted dismissal of counts eighteen and nineteen with prejudice; and granted dismissal of the punitive-damages demand.