Jane Roe #1 v. Mill Valley School District, et al.

Background

Jane Roe #1 alleged that, while she was a second-grade student at Old Mill Elementary School, a male classmate touched her thigh and genitals during class and touched her a second time on an unspecified occasion. She alleged that the Mill Valley School District and its employees mishandled her report, failed to protect her, continued sending her to a contract therapist after learning about a technique her parents objected to, and disclosed confidential counseling and therapy information to the classmate’s parents.

The District hired Sinead McDonough to investigate the Title IX complaint and Liz DeChellis to decide the appeal. Jane Roe #1 alleged that McDonough assessed only her credibility, treated the classmate’s information more carefully, and included confidential information about her in a report given to the classmate’s parents. She alleged that District officials knew about the disparity and allowed the report to be issued. She also alleged that DeChellis decided the appeal on behalf of the District and that Assistant Superintendent Paula Rigney approved and transmitted the decision.

Motions and Legal Standards

The District moved to dismiss the Title IX discrimination and deliberate-indifference claim and the claim under California Education Code section 220. The five employee defendants—Principal Jason Matlon, Title IX coordinator Erin Conklin, Superintendent Elizabeth Kaufman, Assistant Superintendent Paula Rigney, and counselor Nova Bonnett—moved to dismiss equal-protection, due-process, First Amendment retaliation, and supervisory-liability claims identified in the order. McDonough moved to dismiss six claims, and DeChellis moved to dismiss three claims.

Because the defendants filed motions to dismiss, the court assumed the complaint’s factual allegations were true and asked whether they plausibly stated legal claims. A claim is plausible when the alleged facts support a reasonable inference of liability rather than merely being consistent with possible liability.

District Claims

The District’s motion was granted in part and denied in part. The court dismissed the Title IX claim. It rejected three deliberate-indifference theories: the District’s response to the classmate’s conduct, its failure to prevent that conduct, and its continued use of therapist Rachel Budnick. The court held that the District’s response involved meaningful action, that the alleged earlier pinching incident and impulse-control problems did not establish the required knowledge of a risk of sexual harassment, and that continuing to use Budnick after learning about the disputed therapeutic technique was, at most, careless or wrong rather than a clearly unreasonable decision not to remedy sexual harassment.

The theory based on the District’s response to the classmate’s conduct and the Title IX sex-discrimination theory were dismissed without leave to amend. The pre-incident and Budnick theories were dismissed with leave to amend.

The court dismissed the Title IX sex-discrimination theory because the alleged procedural departures and differences between the complainant and respondent did not plausibly connect the District’s conduct to Jane Roe #1’s sex. The court said the allegations did not show that the District would have treated the parties differently if their sexes had been reversed. The sex-discrimination portion of the section 220 claim was dismissed without leave to amend.

The court denied the District’s motion as to the section 220 retaliation theory, which survives. The court held that section 220 must be interpreted consistently with Title IX and that Title IX’s prohibition on discrimination “on the basis of sex” includes retaliation for complaining about sex discrimination. The court also noted that the District did not challenge the separate Title IX retaliation claim in these motions.

Claims Against District Employees

The employees’ motion was granted. The equal-protection claim was dismissed as to Matlon, Conklin, Kaufman, Bonnett, and Rigney, without leave to amend. The court held that poor handling of the complaint, departures from policy, and the complainant-respondent differences did not plausibly show that the employees acted because Jane Roe #1 was a girl.

The due-process claim was dismissed as to Matlon and Rigney, without leave to amend. The court held that the investigation-based theory failed because it depended on the unsuccessful sex-discrimination theory, and the complaint did not allege that Matlon or Rigney participated in the disclosure of confidential information. The due-process claim remains against Bonnett, Conklin, and Kaufman only on the theory that they disclosed or permitted disclosure of Jane Roe #1’s confidential information.

The First Amendment retaliation claim was dismissed as to Matlon, Conklin, and Bonnett, without leave to amend. The court held that the allegations showed the defendants acted based on their assessment of Jane Roe #1’s report, not because she made the report. The supervisory-liability claim against Rigney was also dismissed without leave to amend because the appeal decision did not violate a constitutional right and therefore gave rise to no underlying constitutional violation for Rigney to supervise.

The order states that these dismissals are without prejudice to a motion under Rule 15 for leave to amend if discovery on surviving claims later produces facts supporting an inference of sex-based or retaliatory motive.

Claims Against McDonough and DeChellis

McDonough’s motion was granted. The court dismissed without leave to amend her equal-protection, due-process, and First Amendment retaliation claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because the complaint did not show that she was a state actor. The court held that investigating and deciding a student’s complaint was not a function traditionally reserved exclusively to the state, and the complaint alleged that McDonough and DeChellis exercised independent judgment rather than acting under District control.

The court also dismissed without leave to amend the negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and invasion-of-privacy claims against McDonough. It applied California’s litigation privilege, which generally bars tort claims based on communications made in an authorized official proceeding when they are connected to that proceeding. The court held that the challenged interviews and report were communications within the Title IX proceeding and that the privilege applied regardless of alleged discriminatory motive.

DeChellis’s motion was granted. Her equal-protection, due-process, and negligence claims were dismissed without leave to amend. The negligence claim was unopposed and also failed on the merits because the complaint did not allege a special relationship creating a duty of care from a neutral appeal decision-maker to the student.

Disposition

The District’s motion was granted in part and denied in part. The employees’ motion was granted. DeChellis’s motion was granted. McDonough’s motion was granted. Jane Roe #1 may amend the two Title IX and section 220 theories concerning the District’s pre-incident conduct and its response to Budnick. The amended complaint was due September 22, 2026, and had to include a blackline comparison with the current complaint.