Jaiyeola v. Brundage

Background

Ganiyu Ayinla Jaiyeola sued Robert A. Brundage based on two documents filed in Jaiyeola’s earlier product-liability case against Toyota. Brundage had been Toyota’s appellate counsel in that case. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed.

After that judgment, Jaiyeola filed a motion seeking relief from the judgment. ECF 371 was the defendants’ opposition to that motion. Jaiyeola later sought sanctions, alleging that Brundage had engaged in unauthorized practice of law. ECF 383 was Toyota’s opposition to Jaiyeola’s request to file a reply, and Jaiyeola again sought sanctions, alleging that Brundage signed ECF 383 without being an attorney of record.

The district court denied Jaiyeola’s sanctions motions as frivolous and instructed the clerk to reject further filings from him in that case. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Jaiyeola then sued Brundage personally in Michigan based on similar allegations. That case was dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, and the dismissal was affirmed. The Sixth Circuit later affirmed the denial of Jaiyeola’s request for relief from judgment and imposed $3,000 in sanctions against him.

Claims and Motion

In this case, Jaiyeola alleged that Brundage ghostwrote ECF 371 and signed ECF 383 despite not being an attorney of record. He asserted a due process claim, a claim based on the federal courts’ inherent power to impose sanctions, and claims for fraud and perjury. He sought compensatory and punitive damages, equitable relief, costs, and attorney’s fees.

Brundage moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), which permits dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, and Rule 12(b)(6), which addresses failure to state a legally sufficient claim. Brundage argued that Jaiyeola lacked standing and had not alleged facts supporting a legally cognizable claim.

Court’s Analysis

The court held that Jaiyeola lacked standing. Standing requires a plaintiff to show a concrete and particular injury, that the defendant caused the injury, and that a court order would likely remedy it.

Jaiyeola identified the injury as losing his case against Toyota. But ECF 371 and ECF 383 were filed after judgment had already been entered against him. The court therefore reasoned that those filings could have caused the loss only if they caused the denial of Jaiyeola’s motion for relief from judgment. The court found that the motion was denied because it was frivolous and sought to relitigate issues already decided. The Sixth Circuit also affirmed on grounds that the motion was procedurally improper, filed more than one year after judgment, partly barred by the law-of-the-case doctrine, and raised arguments that could have been made in the earlier appeal.

The court concluded that Jaiyeola could not show that the motion for relief from judgment would have succeeded without Brundage’s alleged conduct. He therefore could not show an injury caused by Brundage, and the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. Because the court dismissed under Rule 12(b)(1), it did not decide whether Jaiyeola failed to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).

Disposition

The court granted Brundage’s motion to dismiss Jaiyeola’s claims against him for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The dismissal was without leave to amend because the court concluded that Jaiyeola could not cure the lack of standing through amendment. The clerk was ordered to close the case.

The court also denied Jaiyeola’s request for judicial notice that Brundage defrauded him, finding that the request did not concern material eligible for judicial notice under Federal Rule of Evidence 201.