Rud v. Johnston

Background

The plaintiffs are people civilly committed to the Minnesota Sex Offender Program who had been approved for transfer to Community Preparation Services, a lower-security facility. They alleged that officials delayed transfers after valid transfer orders were issued, violating substantive and procedural due-process rights. Some named plaintiffs waited approximately seven to ten months before transfer, while two remained waiting as of the allegations described in the opinion.

The amended complaint named Nancy Johnston, the Executive Director of the Minnesota Sex Offender Program, and Jodi Harpstead, the Commissioner of the Minnesota Department of Human Services, in both their official and individual capacities. The plaintiffs sought damages and renewed their request for a peremptory writ of mandamus, a court order requiring performance of an official duty without first giving the defendants an opportunity to show cause.

Mandamus Request

The court held that it had jurisdiction to consider the mandamus request. It concluded that Minnesota law clearly requires Minnesota Sex Offender Program officials to carry out valid transfer orders within a reasonable time. The court also found that the plaintiffs had alleged a public wrong and that contempt proceedings and injunctive relief were not adequate alternative remedies.

However, a peremptory writ requires the plaintiffs’ right to the requested action to be clear and requires it to be apparent that the defendants have no valid excuse for nonperformance. The court found that whether each plaintiff’s transfer was unreasonably delayed was fact-intensive and not sufficiently clear at the motion-to-dismiss stage. The court therefore dismissed Count I, the renewed request for a peremptory writ of mandamus, without prejudice.

Individual-Capacity Claims and Qualified Immunity

The plaintiffs asserted procedural and substantive due-process claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the defendants in their individual capacities. Qualified immunity protects government officials from damages liability unless they violated a constitutional right that was clearly established when they acted.

The court found that the plaintiffs adequately alleged a constitutional violation because they had a protected interest in timely transfer and alleged that officials deprived them of that interest without procedural protections. But the court concluded that the law did not clearly establish what amount of delay would be an unconstitutional or unreasonable delay. The defendants therefore were entitled to qualified immunity, and the court dismissed Counts II, III, and IV against them in their individual capacities with prejudice.

Official-Capacity Claims and Disposition

Applying the law-of-the-case doctrine, which generally keeps a court’s earlier rulings governing later stages of the same case, the court maintained its earlier rulings on the official-capacity claims. The order denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss as to Count II against them in their official capacities. It dismissed Counts III and IV against them in their official capacities with prejudice.

The order expressly stated that the defendants’ motion to dismiss was granted in part and denied in part. Only the procedural due-process claim against the defendants in their official capacities may proceed. The parties were also required to meet and confer about what constitutes a reasonable transfer time and which factors should be considered.